OCTOBER 1953

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UNITED STATES ARMY

COMBAT FORCES

Infantry Journal

Field Artillery Journal


The Adjutant General
Describes the new
OFFICERS'
EFFICIENCY
REPORT



DIVISION OBJECTIVE

By Lieutenant Colonel Eben F. Swift

SECRET WEAPON ..



Men born to the glory of freedom are uncompromising when this estate is threatened. Their character and purpose are the real "secret weapons" of democracy. The helmet insignias identify diverse nationalities, but the pilots behind these masks are united in their determination to defend independence. It is for these trained men who form our first line of defense, that Republic is scheduled to deliver the swept-wing F-84F THUNDERSTREAK to the USAF and our allies in the North Atlantic Treat; Organization.

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
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UNITED STATES ARMY

COMBAT FORCES

INFANTRY JOURNAL



FIELD ARTILLERY JOURNAL 1910-1950

PUBLISHER

Col. Arthur Symons, Arty-USAR

ARTILLERY EDITOR

Col. Robert F. Cocklin, Arty-NGUS

EDITOR
John B. Spore

INFANTRY EDITOR

Maj. Orville C. Shirey, Inf-USAR

ASSISTANTS TO THE PUBLISHER

N. J. Anthony

Esther E. Bennett

ASSISTANT TO THE EDITOR Helen L. McGuire

Vol. 4, No. 3

October 1953

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PRISONER EXCHANGE—During the exchange of sick and wounded war prisoners in Korea, Sikorsky H-19 helicopters of the Army's 6th Transportation Helicopter Company flew a steady shuttle between the exchange point near Munsan and hospitals in Seoul. Six patients were carried on each flight during the week-long operation.



INTERNATIONAL SERVICE—Sabena Belgian Airlines in August opened the first scheduled international helicopter passenger service, supplementing its regular airline service to all of Europe, the Near East and Africa. Using big Sikorsky S-55s, helicopter flights will serve cities in Belgium, Holland, France, Germany and Luxemburg.



FAST SERVICE—With Sikorsky S-55 helicopters, the first regularly scheduled U. S. helicopter passenger service has been opened by New York Airways. In July, regular passenger flights began between LaGuardia, New York International, and Newark Airports in the New York City area. Only minutes are needed for inter-airport trips, which once took hours by surface vehicle.

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E knew our readers would like "Give Us Back Our Pride" when we published it in the August issue and we are glad so many of you have written us saying so. Most of you who wrote us called it an "editorial." as did Mr. Hanson Baldwin, who wrote a couple of columns on it in The New York Times. It wasn't a staff editorial but an article, strongly editorial in tone, by an Army colonel who didn't want his name on it. We thought we had made this clear in the line that read: "An old-timer says . . ." We are proud to have published it even though it advocated some things that are not necessarily believed in by the JOURNAL. This, as you know, follows the JOURNAL'S practice of publishing

opinions that "may be at variance" with those held by the Association's officers and the editors, as the statement on our contents page puts it each month.

YOU also liked—and this was an editorial—"On Commissaries and Productivity" in the September issue. The JOURNAL intends to continue to hit hard at all selfish and unwarranted attacks on professional service men and women. And we also intend to publish lucid, hard-hitting articles, such as the one by the "old-timer," that suggest ways for the Army itself to improve the lot of its officers and men and make the Army better able to fulfill its vital mission.

CITY HALL HAS ITS HAND OUT, TOO

YOU can add City Hall and the State Capitol to your list of special interests that want to put their hands in the service man's pocket and extract some of his hard-earned dollars. Representative Joel T. Broyhill of Virginia has introduced a bill which would require members of the armed forces to pay local personal property taxes and state income taxes in communities and states in which they are stationed.

The service family appreciates living in a pleasant, comfortable community with good schools, safe streets, public libraries, adequate parks and playgrounds, and an alert and progressive local government. It may appreciate them more than the permanent residents of such communities, for most service families have experienced living in communities that were not comfortable, pleasant, clean or progressive. The service family also knows that these things have to be paid for and that Americans pay for them because they are a part of what makes our standard of living the highest the world has ever known.

BUT the service family is without choice as to where it shall live and without influence in civic affairs. The service man is a "captive" resident and it is therefore unfair and unreasonable to so tax him. The federal government has long recognized this, by indirection at least. Schools are by far the most costly item in the local budget and the federal government pays local school boards a fair share of the cost of educating stu-

dents of service families (and other defense workers) in any community that has a heavy influx of such families. And the federal government also contributes financially to the school building programs of such communities.

This is a sound principle, generally recognized and followed by the business world. When a business firm temporarily transfers a man it customarily pays all of his extraordinary expenses; and certainly all service assignments are temporary. If City Hall finds that the cost of local government is unduly burdensome because of the large number of service families in the community, it should appeal to the federal government for assistance, rather than ask for a law that will let it tax the "captive" service families within its midst.

SERVICE families do not want to be and aren't "free loaders." They have heavy expenses that never appear in the budgets of permanently located families. Their pay does not keep up with the cost-of-living index and they are constantly finding that they must now pay for services that formerly were considered part of their rights.

Prices in post exchanges have gone up. Commissaries are threatened with extinction. Medical services for dependents are being reduced and may be entirely eliminated. Expense allowances no longer pay full expenses. And so it goes. Add to all this the grasping fingers of the local tax collector and the burden becomes well-nigh intolerable.

MILITARY NEWS from the world's largest light plane producer



Development of the new XL-19B gas turbine powered observation plane is one of many military projects now in operation at Cessna plants in Wichita, Prospect and Hutchinson, Kansas.

Others include production of bomber and fighter plane parts for the Air Force, a helicopter for the Navy, more L-19s for the Army, Marines and National Guard and experimentation on Boundary Layer Control which shortens the landing and take-off of high-speed aircraft.

CESSNA AIRCRAFT COMPANY, WICHITA, KANSAS


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These improvements will materially simplify the maintenance and supply problems of ground crews who must service planes in inaccessible combat areas.

IN OBSERVATION PLANES AND BOUNDARY LAYER CONTROL





Cessna SETS THE PACE

MEETING ENGAGEMENT

Prepare for the kind of military reading you want in the fall and winter issues of COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL, now in preparation. The November issue will contain such representative articles as these:

Invasion Jeopardized

Brig. Gen. Poschol N. Strong tells a "now it can be told" story of how the success of the invasion of Normandy in 1944 was thrown into danger by sudden changes of plan that made months of careful planning worthless and drove members of an overworked planning section into the hospitals.

The Infantry Division: Triangular or Square?

Brig. Gen. George E. Lynch argues persuasively and to the point in advocating formation of a square division that eliminates the brigade headquarters. He says it will bring self-restorative powers to the division and give regimental and division commanders more flexibility.

Promotion System in Transition

Army is in a state of change from a policy of promotion by seniority to promotion by selection and that the problem of adjustment leaves few officers happy. The big question is whether the system will produce the kind of army we must have.

Self-Propelled Artillery in Positional Warfare

Lieut. Col. Jerry F. Dunn tells how a highly mobile 155mm SP battalion adjusted itself to the stalemate of the Korean conflict.

* To the Editors . . . *

Renewal and Criticism

To the Editors:

Enclosed are my membership dues. However, now that I am in good graces again, I feel free to make a criticism of our JOURNAL. Not of content, but only that there is not enough content. I realize the present high cost of publishing such an excellent magazine. I do, however, believe the cost could be reduced by less artistic covers, and the use of less expensive paper. I believe there to be many like myself, who would appreciate and treasure the CFJ if it were printed on wrapping paper, if the content were increased.

In the future, I would appreciate information of foreign armies. Not only of potentially aggressor nations, but of our allies.

EDMUND T. BROHMAN

1517 E. 54th St. Chicago 15, Ill.

• Thanks for the renewal and the suggestion. Our paper and cover costs are not excessive and cheaper paper would not save enough to add more pages—which is our desire as well as yours.

Error?

To the Editors:

Your usually excellent magazine has committed a most horrible editorial error. You printed an article [called] "This Is Tactics?" in your August issue.

Better change the words of your policy statement from "stimulate thought and promote discussion," to "stimulate thought and/or promote discussion."

CAPT. P. McGrotty U.S.M.C.

405 Linden Circle Huntington, W. Va.

• In the opinion of the editors the stimulation of thought and the promotion of discussion does not preclude an occasional escape to humor that may also prick a few of our cherished conceits—so long as the pricking is without malice or intent to do lasting harm.

Community Traditions

To the Editors:

Your July, 1953 JOURNAL contained two articles that I must write about and in some way try to convey to you how happy I am that you have published them.

The first, by Brig. Gen. George E. Lynch, "Where Is the Regimental Commander?" is a masterful study of regimental command. I have been overwhelmed in the past with hot-shot regimental commanders who spent their time at the front commanding platoons and being so intent on impressing us with their personal heroic conduct that it is very refreshing to read a practical study on the correct way to com-

mand a regiment in combat. You can tell General Lynch he knows his business.

Then of course "Give Us Back Our Pride" has been long overdue. Just one thing is missing-in addition to giving back to the soldiers a unit to be proud of you certainly should never miss on giving the citizen soldier his sectional or geographic groupings. At the bare mention of this I can already hear the pitiful peepings of those who will cry "high casualty rates in one community" but with never a thought to the high morale factor involved. As a matter of fact, our studies of those communities that had large National Guard casualties show that they were always first in war bond drives and related activities, that the "high casualty rate" was reduced when the PWs returned, that percentagewise those communities ran no higher in casualties than other like communities of comparable size, and finally. without exception those communities demanded the return of those units upon reorganization. I think you will agree that is high morale.

We will never win the next war with those faceless things that G1 calls "bodies" —we must have units that know their traditions and will die for them.

Maj. Gen. Butler B. Miltonberger Retired

North Platte, Nebr.

• Thanks for a fine letter from a former National Guardsman who served with distinction as a regimental and assistant division commander in Europe in 1944-45.

Unit Pride

To the Editors:

Not often do I write letters to editors but the current issue of COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL published "Give Us Back Our Pride" which must not go unnoticed.

As an intelligence officer in the 386th Bombardment Group in the European Theater during World War II, I had a certain pride in "belonging" to that group although the majority of people who ask me in which unit I served never heard of it. Having served in the Aviation Section of the Signal Corps in World War I, I seldom recall my unit . . . therefore I am always glad to read the sound comments you publish in COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL. I believe we have become too interested in "parades" and not enough concerned with field operations and eventual combat results.

Your effort to give the soldier a deep sense of pride in himself, his unit and his branch of service is vitally important to our survival as a free people. After World War I, I was convinced that we were all fighting to stay alive, to preserve the individual and unit spirit which always results in a good job, well done. I have a feeling of deep sympathy for all our men who

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
R-F Power Output: Adjustable from -7 to -85 dbm (decibels relative to one milliwatt).

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Accuracy: ±1.5db. A calibration chart is supplied.

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"Fish or Cut Bait"

To the Editors:

Down this way we enjoyed "Fish or Cut Bait" [August issue] a lot. A kick in the teeth was indicated—and in the proper choppers. You did that good. Too often complainants blame the Reserve officers. I contend that even National Guard officers couldn't make the Reserve program (?) work—which means it can't be made to do business.

Brig. Gen. Charles G. Sage The Adjutant General Santa Fe, New Mexico

To the Editors:

Please accept my heartiest congratulations on "Fish or Cut Bait." . . . I read this today and I find it is most timely and directly to the point. I only hope that responsible individuals in the Department of Defense and the congressional committees place the proper degree of importance on what you have written.

Brig. Gen. Gerard W. Kelley Hq. New York Nat. Guard 270 Broadway, N.Y., N.Y.

To the Editors:

I have enjoyed reading your very interesting article "Fish or Cut Bait." It is not often that the status of the National Guard is so clearly and accurately recorded in service publications. Its wide distribution will be very beneficial.

There is one more thought that I hope, at your leisure, you may explore and dis-

cuss:

"Why should Selective Service induct bona fide officers and men who are already in the armed forces, receiving Federal training and subject to the immediate call of the President?"

Maj. Gen. S. Gardner Waller Virginia National Guard Richmond 19, Va.

To the Editors:

"Fish or Cut Bait" is well written, your facts hold water and your logic is clear. I concur completely with your thinking and I congratulate you not only upon the article, but upon your courage in publishing a piece that is somewhat controversial.

We have been enjoying the COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL for some time, and in the old days, of course, *The Field Artillery Journal*, since I am an artilleryman, even though I wear the GS insignia.

COL. HARLAN D. BYNELL

Adj. Gen. Office St. Paul, Minn.

To the Editors:

Surely enjoyed "Fish or Cut Bait." It really is well written. Someday maybe



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there can be a good program developed for the Organized Reserves instead of having them try to enter into the field which, I feel, should be exclusively that of the National Guard. There are many ways that officers of the ORC could be trained adequately but, so far, no one seems to want to use these methods.

Maj. Gen. Raymond H. Fleming The Adjutant General Louisiana National Guard, New Orleans 12, La.

To the Editors:

Colonel Robert Cocklin's "Fish or Cut Bait" in the August issue was extremely thought-provoking. As a noncom in a National Guard unit I am very much interested in any idea that would better the Guard and at the same time strengthen our country's defenses.

Probably the best method of strengthening an organization is to instill a strong feeling of pride in the individual man. Pride not only in his unit, but in himself and the job he is doing. The question is, how can this best be accomplished?

First of all a man has pride in his job when he is sure he is doing it well and that he is necessary. This confidence in himself can only be developed by thorough training. As for the feeling of being needed, that will come almost naturally if the National Guard unit holds the esteem of the citizens of the community and provided his superiors follow it up by emphasizing the importance of the individual as a part of the team.

The problem then is to see that the individual Guardsman receives the proper training in his specialty to enable him to do a good job. Naturally my opinion is biased; but I feel that along with this the man who must be forced by law into serving his country should get the short end of the stick.

A possible method might be based on the present draft age of 18½ and the present enlistment age of 17. Between the ages of 17 and 17½ the individual would be permitted to enlist in the National Guard for a period of four years with the provision that two years of this hitch would be spent on active duty in his National Guard specialty, either with a Regular Army unit or at one of the Army service schools. If when eligible he desires to attend one of the OCS courses this should be counted as part of his active duty time.

A Guardsman would not go on active duty until he had completed at least one year of orientation training in his National Guard unit and specialty. Upon completion of his tour of duty he would be returned to the same unit. When he does leave for active service, however, he should have the minimum rank of private E and preferably private first class, or possibly even corporal, if he is exceptionally well qualified.

The draftees, on the other hand, would

be used as fillers to allow the Guardsmen on active duty to get the greatest value out of the training. Of course the draftee would have approximately the same opportunities as the Guardsman, but would be at a definite disadvantage because of the Guardsman's one year of training.

At the end of his two years active duty the draftee would be given his choice of two additional years EAD or of enlisting in a Class A reserve unit with the understanding that if his record was not satisfactory he would complete the two years in active service.

The present system of selecting officers of the Guard is satisfactory in that it allows the individual Guardsman to come up through the ranks either by taking extra time at home to complete the Series 10 Extension Course or by attending an OCS

James F. McGillivray 6938 S. Cregier Ave. Chicago 49, Ill.

To the Editors:

Just a few lines about Colonel Cocklin's "Fish or Cut Bait." It would have been a far better day if instead of baiting the ORC, the good Colonel had gone fishing. One of the most disturbing things about this one-sided article is that if it isn't Journal policy, as such, the writer, holding the job he does with the Journal, is somewhat closer to headquarters than the average Journal contributor.

Colonel Cocklin doesn't appear to be too much of a team man. He seems to think that the Guard has done great things with no help from anyone. This is far from the case. Every National Guard division down through the years in the test of getting ready for combat (which is what we exist for) has drawn its real strength from the outside. Colonel Cocklin knows this and yet in trying to make the National Guard look so ready and self-sufficient and helpful he went far out of his way to kick the ORC. Many truthful statistics could be quoted which might slightly tarnish the luster of Colonel Cocklin's picture. Possibly some of these "unpretty" facts should be printed, but our theory is that we don't build ourselves up by trying to tear someone else down.

Colonel Cocklin possibly intended for his "satellite unit" suggestion to be the most galling and degrading point in his whole article. It would probably surpise him to know that many Reserve officers, especially those in ORC combat units now, would be glad to take him up on the suggestion. Maybe we could have a little competition and a policy that, if the unit was better led by the ORC officers, the National Guard officers would become the satellites. From what I have seen in my years in the NG and at the present time in the ORC I know where my money would be.

be.

This Army of ours is a three-horse team, working abreast, and if all of us, the Regulars, Guardsmen and Reservists, do not realWorking under pressure?..

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ize that we are mutually supporting and pulling-forward-horses, there will surely come an unhappy day for our national de-

COL. NORBORNE P. BEVILLE 3536 S. Wakefield St. Arlington, Va.

· "Fish or Cut Bait" was not an expression of Journal policy. As the statement on page 2 says, it is Journal policy "to print articles . . . [that] stimulate thought and promote discussion . . . regardless of the fact that some of the opinions advanced may be at variance with those held by the officers of the Association . . . and editors.'

Infantry Song

To the Editors:

I doubt if Hollywood realizes it but it seems to have come up with a song for the Infantry.

The title is "Take the High Ground," from a picture of the same name. I heard it played by a local disc jockey several weeks ago and promptly purchased a copy.

The tune is the catchiest I have ever heard for an infantry song and the lyrics are to the point, mentioning various battles, the sacrifices and finally the whole reason for an infantry, "the fight to make men free.

Only one sore point, is the complete omission of the name of any World War II battles; plenty of the Revolutionary and Korean, but none from World War II.

The tune being as catchy as it is, it wouldn't take much to write some additional lyrics incorporating more battle names.

I'm not plugging the picture, just suggesting that the Infantry may finally have a song.

JAMES P. CAHILL

5817 Riviera Drive Coral Gables, Fla.

Recon Company

To the Editors:

I enclose remittance for the renewal of my subscription to Combat Forces Jour-NAL. Also to express a desire for information or an article on what gives today with the Division Reconnaissance Company.

I served four years with First Reconnaissance Troop, later redesignated First Reconnaissance Company, 1st Infantry Division. I have been wondering how these Recon companies function today? Have tactics changed, been revised, TO&Es changed? Of course, company reconnaissance is not on the same scale as regiment or squadron reconnaissance tactics.

It seems to me that an article on the recon company might also be of interest to others. I realize that I am only one of many who read and admire the JOURNAL. It surely must be a headache to try and satisfy each and every one of your readers. I not only like the Journal, I appreciate

I enjoyed "Get a Prisoner," in the June issue. It was a well executed operation. In my four years, 1940-1944, I can't remember when our missions weren't fully explained and everyone understanding fully what was expected from the mission. Map reading is a must for everyone, regardless of rank.

Sometimes I believe the JOURNAL almost as good as a refresher lecture, only easier to understand.

FRANCIS W. LAVERTUE

Concord, N. H.

• Thanks. We'll try to get something good about the reconnaissance company. Actually it hasn't changed a great deal.

Leadership and Rank

To the Editors:

I have read with interest your articles and the letters to the editor for some time. I am not the letter-writing type. but some of the ideas that you have been printing are just too much for me. I would like to express my comments on one or two.

One of your letter-to-the-editor writers wrote: "One of the biggest and greatest problems we have in the Army today is the lack of leadership among junior officers." He says in the same letter that company commanders should be majors; battalion commanders, colonels, and so on. If that is a solution, I'll stand on my head in front of the flagpole at high noon. You can not make a leader out of a man by hanging more rank on him. That is like the general who heard that troops with high morale sang while they marched. So, he issued an order that all troops on the march would sing, thus attaining high morale. The reason that we do not have better leadership among our junior officers (or senior officers for that matter) is that we have gotten away from the old idea of: (1) give a man a job (2) give him the stuff, and (3) get the hell away from him and let him do it. There is no problem in leadership that cannot be cured by inspiration from the top, instead of interference from the top. Give the company back to the company commander and he will make out all right.

I do not believe that it is necessary to promote the company commander to major, either. The company commander is the company commander. He is the same man regardless of how many times you promote him. The job is just as complex, and if he is worth a damn he won't take any guff from the battalion staff. If the point is that it takes a mature, experienced man to command a company, I agree. But I fail to see how the arbitrary promotion of a bunch of "kid" captains and lieutenants to major will give them maturity and experience. I commanded a company as a second lieutenant. I had my problems, but I am sure that if I had been promoted to major on the spot, my problems would have been just as great. I learned the hard way, the only way-through experience.



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Guided Missiles Division, Wyandanch, L. I., N. Y. Engine Division, Farmingdale, L. I., N. Y.

He Was the Last Man



Pfc. Hector A. Cafferata Jr., USMCR Medal of Honor



It was during the Chosin reservoir fighting. Against F Company's hill position. Reds were attacking in regimental strength. The last of Private Cafferata's fire team-mates had just become a casualty, leaving a gap in the defense line. If the enemy could exploit it, they could smash the entire perimeter.

Exposing himself to devastating fire, Private Cafferata maneuvered along the line. Alone, he killed fifteen Chinese, routed the rest, and held till reinforcements plugged the hole.

The Reds hit again. A grenade fell into a gully full of wounded. Private Cafferata hurled it back, saving the men but suffering severe wounds. Ignoring intense pain, he still fought on until a sniper got him.

"If we really want to protect ourselves from the Commies," says Private Cafferata, now retired because of wounds, "we've got to go all out. And one thing all of us at home can do-should do—is invest in our country's U. S. Defense Bonds. Sure, Defense Bonds are our personal savings for a rainy day. But they're more—they're muscle behind our G.I.s' bayonets, too!"

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Peace is for the strong! For peace and prosperity save with U.S. Defense Bonds!



The U.S. Government does not pay for this advertisement. It is donated by this publication in cooperation with the Advertising Council and the Magazine Publishers of America. One final point, the ballooning of officer rank is not in the best interest of the service. One of the major reasons why so many enlisted men are leaving the service is that high enlisted rank has become so commonplace that there is no incentive to become a senior NCO. Why not? Because practically everyone is a sergeant. A man gains no prestige by attaining that rank. He is still one of many. The same thing could happen to the officer corps.

Maj. Charles S. Stough, Jr. Staff Commander, Amphib. Tng Comd U.S. Naval Amphibious Base Coronado, Calif.

Replacement Training

To the Editors:

One of the gravest problems in the entire Army today is the system of replacement training. When a new soldier is inducted into the Army he begins his four months of basic training. He is then given his post-basic leave and assigned to a unit. To get to his unit, particularly if it is overseas, often takes longer than a month.

Hence the new soldier after four months of basic must spend half again that time processing and travelling to reach his unit. During this period of time, the new soldier receives no training and is subject to the loosest form of discipline, in many cases actually approaching an absence of discipline.

When the new soldier arrives at his unit, he is assigned a job and expected to produce. But he has forgotten a lot that he was taught in training and is inclined to disregard his officers and noncoms.

It is this type of replacement, moreover, who is often killed in action shortly after reaching his unit, or, worse yet, who causes his unit to fail in its objective.

Possibly the present truce will allow for some repair of the damage done earlier, both as to discipline and team training.

Basically, the solution to much of the problem lies in abolishing the present system of replacement training and substituting for it a system of unit training.

I am certain that regiments and battalions could be trained as units, and transferred as bodies to overseas divisions. The Army is not so small that we could not efficiently return to the unit training system of earlier times.

It will only be when officers have a chance to mold their units into a team and to subject their men to constant and continuous discipline and training, that we can expect any material improvement to be made.

PVT. DONALD E. CLOSE

235th FA Obn. Bn. APO 264, c/o PM San Francisco, Calif.

• A change in the method of sending replacements to Korea was begun before the truce was signed. It provided for small groups of men who had trained together to travel together to Korea.



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Ø

When the first American passed the eleventh tree, Private Mueller slowly squeezed the trigger

Division Objective

LIEUTENANT COLONEL EBEN F. SWIFT

ILLUSTRATIONS BY MAJOR LACHLAN M. FIELD

That the Big Red One was ever stopped by a lone enemy rifleman is fiction . . . but it could be true and if we are wise we'll never forget it

COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL

"Let George Do It"

GEORGE COMPANY was the advance guard again. "Let George do it" had been the cynical comment of the men as they started out from Seckenheim at 0600 on Friday, 26 April 1945. Seckenheim was a small German village twenty miles east of the Rhine. The outfit had pulled in behind E Company about 1900 the night before. So George Company led out the next morning, hoping that this day would be as easy for George Company as the preceding day had been for Easy Company.

It looked good. Schweinheim, three kilometers east, had been cautiously approached and warily entered; no resistance. On to Hofberg, two kilometers more; no resistance. Tauf, Weinheim, Kirchheim—the same story. Tenseness began to disappear from the stubbled faces of George Company. Rifles went

from high port to sling arms. Packs and equipment became lighter, the steps got swingier. Had the Krauts finally had it? Are they folding up? Maybe for a day or two. Not many infantrymen thought beyond that.

Rifleman Joe Rivera was thinking beyond that. He was thinking for the first time in many weeks that he might safely get back to Mamacita. I won't have to be lead scout any more once we get into Grosheim whose yellow sign was up the road about 250 yards away. Maybe now, finally, it won't be so tough any more. Maybe the astounding luck that had carried him through the Bulge, across the Rhine, and up to here without a scratch, would hold out just a few more weeks. The war couldn't last much longer than that. Joe Rivera was only thinking this with part of his mind. Lead

scouts have other things to think about; he was still at high port, moving his head and eyes from side to side, not looking for the enemy as you might think, but for possible cover to take after the enemy fired his first shot. Joe Rivera had been a scout long enough to know that you just didn't see the enemy until after that first shot; you were lucky if you saw him then. He eyed the evenly spaced trees, growing with Teutonic precision on each side of the road, and thought: if there are any Krauts in that town they would have fired by now. Only a few more yards and he could start breathing easier. Then he stopped thinking altogether, because he had nothing left to think with. His brains spattered out of the back of his head, partly in his helmet, which had a small round hole in the front and a large jagged one in the back, and partly on the brick road, on which he had slumped forward. His rifle made two distinct



clacks as it hit the road, butt first. It was 1400 hours.

EORGE COMPANY was surprised. This is the one unpardonable military sin, but in this case it was quite pardonable; in fact, it was inevitable. George Company was no green outfit; it was George Company of the 18th Infantry, 1st Division. Up to this time it had been everything an advance guard should be; aggressive, alert, fast moving, the spearhead of a seasoned outfit. George Company had taken fifteen per cent casualties in two days at Gela and had continued advancing to take its objective. It had taken thirty-seven per cent casualties at Omaha Beach in a matter of hours and had continued on to its objective. It had taken twenty-two per cent casualties in three days at the Bulge, but had held its position. It had two unit citations, it had damned good officers and damned good men-only the good ones were left. If Corporal Rivera had been killed in an earlier engagement, there would have been little effect on the men of the company. They probably wouldn't have noticed his loss until hours after the battle had died down. But they noticed it now. George Company was temporarily paralyzed. Nothing like this had ever happened to it before.

Here they had been marching down the road on a fine spring day with the Krauts on the run when suddenly a single shot rings out and a man is dead in the road—like a cheap murder mystery. The men went to the ground, of course, at the crack of that first shot. Some seconds later a few of them poked cautious heads around the bases of the trees along the road and over the furrows of the plowed fields beyond the trees. Nothing was to be seen. The men waited for the enemy to open fire so they could at least get this scrap started if there was going to be a scrap. Nobody fired. It was eerie. Men started talking in whispers, then in loud, strident voices. "What the hell's going on?" "Why ain't we moving?" "Why don't somebody do something?" A radio started crackling. "Yeah, about 250 yards out of Grosheim . . . right through the head . . . I don't know why the hell they're not shooting. I'm going up now to find out . . . how about some mortars . . . dammit, that's a hell of a place for them. Why the hell don't those boys ever get that stuff off vehicles . . . I know they're heavy -veah, my 60s are going into position now . . . artillery . . . you were in to them a while ago. Sure, I know they did a good job back there but I need it now. O.K., O.K., I'll let you know. Over

Captain Stevens, CO of George Company, moved forward, first by running from tree to tree and then by crawling in a small depression by the side of the road. His radio man sweated behind him.

Sergeant Leonard Rynowski, squad leader of Joe Rivera's squad, finally came to his senses. He, like many other George Company men, had been peeping cautiously into Grosheim, hoping to catch a glimpse of this mysterious sniper who had knocked off his best scout, or any other sign of enemy activity. He suddenly realized he wasn't going to see anything. So he bellowed:

"All right, you guys, start shooting. What's the matter with you? Buncha recruits? C'mon fire, goddammit, whatta ya think you're here for? Get going. Decker, you heard me, didn'tcha. Get that rifle on your shoulder and shoot. Go ahead." Decker blinked at this simple command as if it were entirely new. Although battle-experienced, he had that curious reluctance of a soldier to fire his rifle. "Where at, sarge? I can't see nothing." "In the town, dammit, the Krauts are in there, aren't they? Just shoot." Finally Decker's M1 barked. George Company's first shot was fired at 1423. Other rifles began to crack, then the BARs and TMGs chimed in. By 1432 60s were coughing and ker-blamming in Grosheim. So far as anyone knew, not a shot had been fired in return. Sergeant Rynowski decided it was time to move. He crawled to his secondin-command, Sergeant James Raymond. "Ray," he said, "I'm going up to check on Joe, maybe he's still alive. I've seen guys get half their head blown off and still live. You round up the rest of the men, and when I give you the signal take 'em up to that clump of bushes over there; I'll meet you there; then we're going into that . . . ing town. You got that?" Raymond nodded. "O.K., but don't let 'em bunch up," Sgt. Rynowski growled and began to crawl toward the road. When he got within ten yards of Rivera's body he stood up and walked in a slow crouch to the body. He never covered the last five yards. At 1447 a single bullet went right through his heart.

Captain Stevens raged and fumed in-

Lieutenant Colonel Eben F. Swift, Infantry, is an occasional contributor to this magazine and one of those officers who were encouraged to write by Colonel Greene, the late editor of this magazine. You will see why when you read "Division Objective." Colonel Swift himself says that a large part of his purpose in writing "is to be the spokesman for the 'forgotten man' in the Army: the great middle class of the officer corps, the field grade offi-



COLONEL SWIFT

cer." Colonel Swift wants to give a knockout punch to the notion that the work of our field grade officers is "generally mediocre" and that what the field grade officer "thinks and does is of no interest and of not much importance." Colonel

Swift has been a field grade officer himself since 1943. He entered the Army as an enlisted man in 1933, attended the Military Academy, from which he graduated in 1940, and is also a graduate of The Infantry School and the Command and General Staff College. During the Second World War he commanded a battalion of the 27th Infantry, 25th Division, in Luzon, and also served on division and higher staffs in the Pacific theaters. From 1949 to 1952 he served in Europe on the EUCOM staff, as a battalion commander in the 18th Infantry, 1st Division, and on the staff of Seventh Army. He is now on duty at The Infantry School. It should be unnecessary to add that the characters in "Division Objective" are all products of Colonel Swift's creative imagination and no one should attempt to connect them in any way with any actual persons, living or dead.

any way with any actual persons, living or dead.

The artist who illustrated "Division Objective," Major Lachlan M. Field, Artillery-USAR, now at The Artillery School, has illustrated occasional pieces for this magazine and its predecessors for many years. During the Second World War he served in Europe with a corps' artillery outfit, and he recently completed another tour of duty in

the same theater.

wardly. He was able to get the facts from Lieutenant Hagood, the 2d Platoon leader, by 1452. He had lost one of his best scouts and his best squad leader within the hour. Stevens didn't like the situation. He didn't know whether there were two Krauts or two hundred in that town. Ordinarily, they either fired a lot more than they had here, or they got the hell out. He couldn't understand it.

He had reported to the battalion CO that he was receiving intense fire from Grosheim. He felt a few qualms about that; nobody knew for sure whether there were more than two shots fired from there. But any fire that is fired at you is intense, particularly when it kills two men. Colonel Keats was coming up. He was to meet him along the road 500 meters from Grosheim, near where the Colonel had an OP.

"Well, Steve, did you run into a bear trap up there? I thought things were going a little too well to last. Sorry to hear of your loss of those two men. Can you get moving again now?"

"Colonel, I don't want to go barging in there until I know more about it. If I could get some mortars and artillery to work it over first, it'll help."

"O.K. Our mortars are getting set now. Artillery said they could give me a battalion three rounds in about a half hour. You get set to move at 1600. I'll have your prep fires set up for five minutes before 1600. What time have you got now?"

"1503."

"Set your watch ahead two minutes. Take me on up to your front, will you? Maybe I can see something up there. But don't get me shot—not on purpose, anyway. I have all the Purple Hearts I want—none." "Get that dope out, will you, Buck," he said to his \$3. Then to Stevens, "O.K., let's go."

Colonel Keats got a good look at the town and the ground around it, but saw no enemy activity. Plans for the attack went on. The firing gradually died down. Movement in George Company became discernible. Weapons moved into position. Lieutenant Hagood called his squad leaders behind a small clump of bushes to left of the road to issue his orders. It was here and at exactly 1547 that disaster again struck George Company. The first burst from the enemy machine gun raked the clump of bushes and Hagood and one squad leader were killed. The platoon sergeant and another squad leader were severely wounded. The gun shifted its fire to a light machine gun going into position at the base of one of the trees by the road. The

George Company was no green outfit . . . it was aggressive, alert, fast-moving, could take casualties and keep on going





General Appleton stared in disbelief at a reddening hole in the right shoulder of his blouse

gunner and his assistant were killed. An ammunition bearer was wounded. Several more bursts were fired along the front of the two assault squads of the 2d Platoon, and one squad of the 3d which had deployed for the attack. The men had a little time to take cover after the first bursts were fired, but still one man was killed and six were wounded in the three squads.

The enemy machine gun went silent as the mortar and artillery preparation went off exactly as scheduled. It landed right on target. Great clouds of smoke and dust rose from Grosheim, and no living thing there could have failed to have been jarred to the teeth by the explosions. But at the completion of the preparation George Company did not move.

COLONEL KEATS called at 1617 to find out why. He was not casual now. "Steve, I want to let you fight your own battle without harassing you, but I don't like the way things look from here. Are you moving? And if not, why not?"

Stevens was one of those rare commanders who weren't afraid to tell their superiors things were going wrong when they were going wrong. This was to his credit. It was also to the credit of Colonel Keats that he was able to listen to his subordinate's adverse report without getting upset. Both of these traits are more unusual in combat commanders than one might think. Stevens was a little excited. He blurted out:

'No, Colonel, we are not moving. Those Krauts are looking right down our throats. They've knocked off all my key men. They must have some new kind of telescope or something in there. They seem to know every move we make. That machine gun stopped us before we even got started. I've been down there trying to get 'em going, but they just stare at me. I don't understand it: I've never seen 'em like that before. Hagood's dead. So are McClosky and Haines. I need litters. I've got wounded that have to be evacuated right now. I don't know how many yet, but I think six litters are enough.


"O.K., O.K., Steve, take it easy now. We'll get you your litters. Stop worrying about that. Now, listen, I've just been talking to the Old Man. The pressure is on. Division wants that town. I don't know why, but evidently it is a lot more important than you or I thought it was. The Old Man is coming up to my OP with the general in forty-five minutes, and I've got to have something to tell

him. Do you think you can get into that town before dark?"

"Colonel, frankly, I don't see how the hell I can replace those leaders, get my casualties out, get these men reorganized, and mount up another attack before dark. I want that town as badly as you do. It's cold out here, but I'd like to dig in for tonight and hit it again in the morning. My men have started digging already."

"Well, all right, I'll recommend that to them. They won't like to hear it, and the Old Man is not going to like me, but as you and I know, you're a hero one day and a bum the next in this racket. I think I can get you the extra time. But I want you to get a patrol in the town tonight and get some information. I am not at all sure the Krauts are there in force in spite of the number of our casualties. And I'm not sure that they won't pull out tonight. If they do, we'll both look awfully silly. I have enough confidence in you and in your men to believe that you'll get 'em back on the stick by tomorrow morning. I plan to move Easy Company abreast of you on your right tonight. I'm going to ask the Old Man for some tanks, all the division artillery, and an air strike in the morning. That's all, I better not keep the general waiting. You'll get further details later. So long."

At 1600 General Appleton, CG, 1st Division, was deep in his map. George Company had not known it, but it was the advance guard, not only of the 2d Battalion, not only of the 18th Infantry, but of the entire Big Red One. As a rule General Appleton was far too wise and experienced to put all his eggs in one basket by moving his division in a single column, but this situation, like most situations, was not a normal one. The divison had broken out of the Rhine bridgehead on a very narrow front. Resistance had been lighter than expected, and one very good road ran east from the bridgehead area. Progress along this road had been rapid. In the division zone to the north there was defensive high ground with a poor road net; to the south the Siegnitz River ran diagonally northwest across the division zone and made a bend just south of Grosheim to the southwest before running into the Rhine. The east-west road net was good in the southern portion of the division zone, but all crossed the Siegnitz, and up to now General Appleton's engineers had reported all bridges across the Siegnitz blown. On General Appleton's map, the situation looked like this:



In addition, G2 had reported that the enemy was withdrawing to the high ground in the north of the 1st Division sector. General Appleton, therefore, had decided to move his entire division along the Grosheim road. After he had seized Grosheim and the two road junctions immediately to the east, he would fan out in three columns and continue the advance, but he had a lot of heavy stuff to get through Grosheim first. Initially, it looked as though his calculated risk had paid off. But now things were beginning to look a little different. He might have known the Germans could see the importance of Grosheim as well as he could. He had three lines of action open to him. He could shift his weight to the north and send the 16th RCT to take the high ground up there and then by-pass Grosheim; he could bridge the Siegnitz and send the 26th across to the south; or he could continue to try to break through Grosheim. The trouble with the first two plans was that they both would take time, and with the Germans on the run it was of tremendous importance to keep after them. If he could get through Grosheim within the next twenty-four hours, he would be all set. He tentatively decided to continue the attack on Grosheim. He would make up his mind finally after talking to John Galloway, CO of the 18th. He handed his map to his aide and motioned to his jeep driver. "Take me up to the 18th," he said.

THE conference at the 2d Battalion OP with General Appleton, Colonel Galloway, and Lieutenant Colonel Keats had been going on for five minutes. Keats had been right when he had said the Old Man wouldn't like the recommendation to postpone the attack until the next day. Colonel Galloway was a forceful and determined commander, but not a patient one. By 1700, however, Colonel Galloway was convinced, and he informed the General of his plan to attack at 0600, 27 April. General Appleton was less concerned about the time of the attack than he was about the projected air strike.

"Tve just checked with my air people," he said, "and Scrappy Nolan's got all the air tied up in his sector until noon tomorrow. That means if we give you that strike it will postpone the attack six valuable hours. I am inclined to think it's not worth it. If we put all that air in there, plus the artillery, plus the tanks, and then find that they have evacuated Grosheim, I'm going to look like an awful monkey. I don't care about that if we save lives by that air strike, but we've got to think of the time factor, too. John, what do you say we call off the air strike?"

"General, if you say to attack without the strike, we'll do it. I'm convinced that the Germans are in Grosheim to stay, though, and it's going to take a lot of pounding to get 'em out. The strike would help a lot, but if you say so we'll take Grosheim without it."

"In that case then, we'll attack at . . ."
General Appleton never finished the sentence. With the crack of a rifle bullet hitting its mark there appeared a slowly reddening hole in the general's blouse at his right shoulder. He looked at it in disbelief. For the next few minutes, although he became very white, the General was the calmest person at the

OP. Everyone scurried around until a medic arrived and nervously dressed the wound. A litter was brought up, but the General refused it saying he could walk to his jeep. As he turned to leave, he smiled at Galloway, "All right, John," he said, "you've convinced me. You'll get your air strike at 1200 tomorrow. See you later."

George Company dug in thoroughly. Easy Company prepared to move up abreast of George after dark. Also, Colonel Galloway planned to move the entire 3d Battalion up abreast of George Company on the left of the 2d Battalion during the night. Its mission was to envelope Grosheim from the north and to seize and hold the road junctions east of that city. At 2100 this movement started. Also at 2100, George and Easy Companies sent patrols into Grosheim. At 2143 a flurry of shots was heard. Shortly thereafter George's patrol leader called Captain Stevens and said that one member of his patrol had been killed and another wounded. He requested permission to return with the wounded man. Permission was granted. The patrol returned at 2231. Colonel Keats and Captain Stevens both interviewed the patrol leader. He was quite excited and unable to furnish much information except that the patrol had run into a German outpost to the left of the main road, and that one of his men had been killed before he knew where it was. The patrol had opened up on the outpost, but he did not know if the fire had any results. So the Germans had not as yet pulled out of Grosheim. This was confirmed by the report of the Easy Company patrol which returned at 2350. It had checked all the roads leading out of Grosheim including the main one to the east, and saw no movement in or out of the town. Another patrol from Fox Company that went out in the early hours of morning checked these same roads and reported the same thing as of 0430. It was therefore assumed that the Germans were still in Grosheim.

THOSE critics of the energy, forcefulness, decisiveness, and effectiveness of American leadership should have heard the verbal orders passed down the chain of command in the 1st Division. Of course, written orders complete with overlays were issued consecutively from division, regiment, and battalion by 0900, but the verbal conversations indicate more thoroughly the spirit and drive of the 1st Division as of 27 April.

General Appleton to Colonel Galloway: "John, you understand the importance I place on getting that town today.



George Company's other prisoner was a dirty, terrified nonentity with a runny nose and a swollen eye. He gave George Gompany its first good laugh in days

The movement of the entire division depends upon it. I've got a squadron of P-47s, all the division artillery, and a company of tanks for you. I'll give you all the help I can, but you've got to get Grosheim by 1600 or our whole plan will have to be revised. If you get it by 1600 there may be a star in it for you. Go to it. I'm counting on you."

Colonel Galloway to Colonel Keats: "Keats, you have done a good job up until now, but I didn't like the way you handled this thing yesterday. I believe you are a little inclined to listen to your subordinates too much. If Stevens had been pushed yesterday he might have got in there. You've got to get in there today, or I'll have to find somebody who can. I want you on your objective by 1500, understand?"

Colonel Keats to Captain Stevens: "Steve, I stuck my neck out for you yesterday, and I'll do it again, but the Old Man is hopping mad about this thing, and we've got to get in there today or neither of our military reputations will be worth a plugged nickel. You've got the toughest job in this attack, and I'm going down there with you personally to see that you do it. You and I have always been friends, but friendship has nothing to do with this. You've got to get in that town by 1430. I think you've known me long enough to know that I mean what I say."

Captain Stevens to his platoon leaders: "All right, listen to this: The pressure is on. Most of you are new at this job, and you may be a little uncertain as to what your job is. Well, I'll tell you. Your job is to lead your platoons into that town or die trying. It's simple enough. I don't ordinarily get this dramatic, but this is not an ordinary mission. You've got to get in that town by 1400 or I don't want to see any of you alive

again. I probably won't be alive myself. I'm serious, does everyone understand that?"

In all cases the answer was identical, and delivered through clenched teeth: "Yessir."

THE morning of the 27th was amazing-ly quiet. Occasional mortar and artillery rounds, registering in, dropped in on the town, but there was no small-arms fire at all. Toward 1200 the tension mounted. A couple of minutes before twelve the P-47s droned toward Grosheim. Each plane circled deliberately over the target, then peeled off and came roaring down in a shallow dive toward the town. The two 500-pounders from each plane could be seen as they dropped, followed by earth-shaking explosions which could be felt for thousands of yards around Grosheim. Then the strafing started, the flaming guns spewed their tracers into Grosheim and pulled up out of their dives, accompanied by the deep throated bop-bop-bop of the caliber .50 machine guns. This went on for twelve minutes. When the P-47s turned their blunt noses homeward, Grosheim was almost obscured by great columns of smoke, but its inhabitants had no respite. At exactly 1215 a division artillery TOT crashed in Grosheim, making it alive with flame and flying wreckage. Shells poured into Grosheim for fifteen more minutes.

Meanwhile tanks lumbered up toward George and Easy Companies' positions. At exactly 1230 the artillery lifted, and the doughboys pulled out of their holes and moved forward with the tanks. Rifle fire from the enemy was mostly wild, but some of it was effective, killing three and wounding four in G Company. A machine gun, possibly the one that had caused all the trouble in George Company the day before, opened up, killing two men and wounding seven in George Company, and caused the attack to stall momentarily. But the men soon started forward again. This time George Company was not to be stopped. The machine gun was silenced. One tank was disabled by a mine, but the rest continued on and entered the town. Machine gun and sporadic rifle fire opened up in Easy Company's sector but there were no casualties. After that there was not much to it. Both companies started cleaning out what was left of the houses. Easy Company had five casualties, George Company six more in the final stages of the attack. Captain Stevens had distinguished himself during these last stages of the fighting. He had suddenly encountered a big strapping German sergeant in the ruins of one of

the houses. The sergeant sent the first shot from his Luger whistling over Stevens' head. The second caught the advancing Stevens on the left side of his shoulder just below the collarbone. Stevens clubbed his carbine in his right hand and shattered it over the sergeant's head, knocking him out. The sergeant revived shortly thereafter, however, and became the second of George Company's two prisoners. Easy Company, meanwhile, had captured fifteen. The other George Company prisoner was a ridiculous looking little fellow captured by Private First Class Manuel Flores, a very good friend of Corporal Rivera's. Flores might have walked right by the German without noticing him because the man was pretending to be dead. But he had furtively reached out to his rifle, beside him and Flores saw the motion. He lifted the German to his feet. The little fellow was terrified. The flaps of his Wehrmacht cap were pulled down over his ears; he had a large, runny nose. One eye was partly closed. His stubbled face was caked with dirt. His ill-fitting uniform was ragged and greasy, and he looked as if he hadn't eaten for days. For some reason or other, though, he clung to his rifle when Flores tried to take it away from him. Flores tore it from his grasp and shoved him toward the rear along the road where Rivera had been killed. The little man started blabbering and shambling to the road. Flores took a few menacing steps toward him to speed him on his way. The man cast a scared look over his shoulder at Flores and started to run in an awkward gait down the road. This afforded the men of George Company the first good laugh they had had in days. The man looked so ludicrous, like Charlie Chaplin, as he scrambled along the road, and many barked at him as he went by, terrifying him even more. Finally, the man fell exhausted and lay there gasping and sobbing in the roadway. The laughing subsided and smiles disappeared from the American faces. Most of them turned away, for no matter how tough most Americans get, they don't like to see living creatures suffer when they are helpless. Finally, a wireman got to his feet. "I've got to get back to battalion anyway, I'll take the miserable little bastard with me," he said, gruffly.

The big German sergeant who had just resumed consciousness and recovered his dignity was a witness to this sordid little drama. If the little fellow could be said to symbolize the dissolution of the Wehrmacht, the sergeant could be said to symbolize its fanatical stubbornness and ingrained efficiency. He

stood very straight, looking disdainfully at his captors. He had long blond hair, a well-tailored uniform, which though somewhat tattered and dirty, retained a good measure of its military dash. He answered all question of the Americans' intelligence sergeant in curt monosyllables. When he saw the sorry spectacle of the little German soldier, he spat contemptuously, obviously disgusted with the disgraceful behavior of his former comrade in arms. He, at least, would show that all honor was not lost in the German Army. He strode off with his dishevelled armed guard as if he were parading down the Tiergarten.

Captain Stevens also witnessed the scene as the medics dressed his wound. No wonder we had such a tough time taking this town with characters like that sergeant around, he thought. Looked like an S.S. man. Well, it was all over now. The general had his town and—by golly, in all the excitement he had forgotten to report to battalion. He called his radio operator, and told him to get battalion. He couldn't resist reporting personally on this one. He pressed on the

was glad to hear it. Glad also to report it to Colonel Galloway, who stated that he was coming right down to see Keats as soon as he reported to division. When Colonel Galloway arrived he wasn't the same man that had talked to Keats that morning.

"Ed," it had been some time since the Colonel had called him Ed, "I've got a present here for you. It's not a medal. I know you have all those you want. It's a bottle of bonded bourbon. You did a grand job taking that town, boy, and this is not much of a reward, but it's the best I've got right now." Keats smiled and mumbled his thanks. He did have all the medals he wanted, including now the one that he hadn't wanted, the Purple Heart, and he appreciated the bourbon, but most of all he was happy that he had regained the Old Man's confidence in his ability to command.

Later, when he saw Steve in the clearing station he said, "I got the facts on your exploit in Grosheim, Steve, and I think it's worth a DSC. That's what we are recommending, anyway. I know



butterfly switch and stated matter-offactly, "This is Banjo-major. George Company secured its objective as of 1353. Out."

Colonel Keats received this report at his battalion aid station. He had been shot through the fleshy part of his leg just above the knee during the first stages of the attack. Stevens had come over to see what the trouble was, but Keats had waved him on. "Get the hell in that town, Steve, this is only a flesh wound. They need you up there. The medics will take care of me." And Steve had gone on. Gone all the way, in fact, and Keats

you always thought Easy Company got all the gravy. It did seem to work out that way, but there is no question in my mind that it was your leadership of George Company that got us into that town and I appreciate it."

GENERAL APPLETON was on the telephone talking to Colonel Galloway: "All objectives taken, eh, John? Those road junctions, too? That's fine. I'm going to send the engineers with bulldozers up to Grosheim to clear the rubble out of the road. Then I'm going to pass the 16th and the 26th through you.



Sergeant Schulenberg was slim-hipped, barrel-chested, a stickler for regulations, a master of unessential detail, and an arrogant bully who ruled through fear

and have you revert to division reserve. Yes, the first part of 'em should be up through there in about an hour. That road is not badly damaged, is it? No, I didn't think so. Well, I'm glad we've got it, I expect we'll have clear sailing for a while, but you never can tell. The arm? Oh, it's OK. The doc wanted to send me to the rear with it, but I talked him out of it. It's just a scratch, but I have to wear a sling with it. The staff and all the people around here regard me with awe now, as if I were a hero. The last time I was wounded was in the Argonne in the first war, but nobody paid much attention to it; now people seem to make quite a big thing of it. Guess generals don't get shot too often any more, not with small arms, anyhow. . . . No, don't worry about that. It was my fault for exposing myself; I should have known better, but I thought we were out of range, to tell the truth. That fellow was a pretty good shot, unless he was just lucky. Did you ever find him or his rifle? No, I suppose not. Well, John. I have this recommendation for your star here on my desk, I'm sending it in right away. Not at all, you deserve it. I've been thinking so for a long time. Tell your people they've done a fine job. They're a grand regiment. That's all. Thank you. Good-bye, John."

General Appleton hung up the receiver and chuckled softly. John Galloway had sounded awfully happy. Well, he meant it. He was proud of John Galloway and his regiment. In fact, he was proud of his entire division. That was a well planned attack, perfectly timed, precisely executed. He rapped his pipe sharply on his field desk. It was exactly 1400 hours, 27 April 1945.

ENERAL APPLETON might not have been so proud, Colonel Galloway might not have been recommended for his star, Lieutenant Colonel Keats might not have been given his bottle of bourbon, and Captain Stevens might never have received his D.S.C. had one simple but amazing fact been known: The entire 1st Division had been stopped for a period of twenty-four hours by one man and only one man! And was this individual a military genius armed with a super secret weapon? He was not; he was just a simple rifleman. The big, handsome, soldierly sergeant who so proudly and arrogantly faced his American captors? No, not him. Incredibly, it was that pitiful, abject, skinny little creature, who afforded the G Company men such a laugh. He was the man who stopped the 1st Division-all by himself. Impossible? Ridiculous? Fantastic? Listen to this-

The Ordeal of Private Hans Mueller

ANS MUELLER was what is known in the American Army as an eightball. German noncommissioned officers and junior officers were far less tolerant of what they considered inefficient eightballs than their American counterparts, and their American counterparts were not so tolerant, either. Therefore, Hans Mueller was, to put it mildly, in hot water most all the time. However, Hans tried hard not only because one had to try hard in the German Army or suffer pretty drastic punishment, but because it was natural for him to try. But it didn't do him much good. In the first place, he was sloppy. Hans Mueller was the type of soldier who could come out for inspection with his shoes and brass shined. his clothes clean and well pressed, well shaven and with a haircut, every separate detail of his personal equipment in perfect order-and still look sloppy. Some people are that way. Hans was absentminded. That is, he had a single-tracked

mind; if he was thinking of one particular thing, his mind would automatically exclude most everything else. Since it was quite inevitable that Hans would dislike many things military, and equally inevitable that a man thinks mostly about things he likes, Hans gave the impression of being extremely forgetful. That didn't go over so big.

It wasn't that Hans disliked everything about the Army—far from it. Actually the Army in general disliked him more than he disliked the Army. The main reason, however, that Hans did not get along in the German Army was a reason that never made much difference one way or another in the American Army, despite what certain popular postwar novelists who have written about the American Army would have you believe—he looked Jewish. That is, he looked like the German conception of a Jew, which had the same effect. He had dark curly hair, a large nose, a rather

pinched sharp face, and protruding ears. Actually, he was more German than most Germans, and if he had a drop of lewish blood in him it's hard to see how it got there. His ancestors had lived in the same small town in Western Germany for centuries. They had worked the same farm, lived in the same house, frequented the same gasthaus, and thought the same provincial thoughts for all those centuries. As anyone knew, no Jewish man, woman, or child had ever lived in that town, and believe me, if any had, the town would have known it.

Hans obviously didn't fit into military society, and anyone who did not fit into the German military society was the object of considerable brutality. This did not make him defiant, or melancholy, or psychoneurotic. He became more obsequious and subservient-a sort of Teutonic Uriah Heep. He became quite flustered when anyone over the grade of corporal spoke to him, giving an impression of complete imbecility when, actually, Hans was not dumb at all.

As a result of his environment, Hans developed two very important military virtues which were to aid him immeasurably in his finest hours. He learned to survive and he developed a kind of craftiness, a wily cunning that made him stay alive and healthy through the most trying combat conditions. A more subtle and indirect result of the trials and tribulations of Hans' military life was his love of weapons, particularly his rifle. Since the normal friendships and comradeship of his brothers-in-arms were generally denied to him, Hans developed a possessive affection for his rifle. He cared for it meticulously, cleaned it, oiled it, protected it from the elements, and made certain that it functioned perfectly always. Although he had been punished for almost every other military delinquency, nobody, not even Sergeant Schulenberg, could ever find fault with Hans' rifle. Another little known fact about Hans was that he could shoot and shoot well.

SERGEANT SCHULENBERG was everything that Private Mueller was not. He was tall, barrel chested and slim hipped. His uniforms fitted him perfectly; his boots were always shined; even in combat the sheen was visible through mud and dust; he was able to appear clean shaven throughout a heavy campaign. He had a very good memory for regulations and an eagle eye, especially for the delinquencies of his subordinates. Sergeant Schulenberg's destiny was shaped by the Nazi system and he was made for it. He loved the pageantry,

the torchlight parades of massed thousands. He liked to beat up people, too, and Hitler had given him the legal opportunity to do it quite often. It was quite natural that he should gravitate to an SS outfit in the early days of the war and also quite natural that he should be a huge success there.

He found that he could dominate officers quite well, particularly the young and inexperienced ones. He was always tactful and respectful about it: "Ja, lieutenant, we can do it that way if you so desire. Of course, regulations state -or the captain usually likes it done this way." Almost invariably it ended up being done Sergeant Schulenberg's way. Sergeant Schulenberg did have the ability to make people do things, and that was what counted. This leadership ability was based upon fear-a principle which we in the U.S. Army frown upon-but in the German Army it got things done.

As time went on, he became a more and more influential member of his company, until on the 6th of April he was practically running the company. On that day, a series of circumstances occurred in the town of Grosheim which made him the company commander in name as well as in fact. B Company had lost communications with battalion. The company commander explained to Schulenberg that he and the only other officer left in the company were going to take the Volkswagen to try to find battalion and request further orders. Sergeant Schulenberg was to take over B Company and defend Grosheim until they returned or until the arrival of further orders. Actually neither officer had an intention of returning to B Company. The Wehrmacht was kaput, and everybody knew it. Sergeant Schulenberg rather suspected that the captain and his friend were deserting, but that suited him fine. He had grown sick of this retreat, retreat, retreat. He felt that he could whip these inferior troops into line with some SS discipline. Sergeant Schulenberg made his authority effective by putting out a very simple order stating that anyone apprehended leaving Grosheim without authority would be shot.

As may be imagined, Private Mueller was not a favorite of Sergeant Schulenberg's. Thus, it was hardly a coincidence that Private Mueller was on outpost duty some fifty yards southwest of the first building in Grosheim with observation of the road to the west shortly before 1400 on 26 April. Sergeant Schulenberg had put Hans Mueller out there with the hope and expectation that if anyone of his sorry garrison of Grosheim were to be shot. Mueller would be the

Hans had learned enough of the art of self-preservation during his nonillustrious military career to dig himself a good position. This position was on the bank of a small canal that flowed odoriferously from the town. It afforded Hans observation, an excellent field of fire, and more important to Hans, superior protection and concealment, and an escape route up through the canal bed. Hans was in position there, his eves on the road to the West while a strange metamorphosis was taking place in his mind. Since his first day of combat on the beach when he had been too paralyzed with fear even to fire his rifle. Hans Mueller had not had any desire to fight. All during the retreat Hans had been concerned only with staying alive. He had learned how to live with fear; he feared Sergeant Schulenberg as much or more than American shot and shell.

But now for the first time he was actually beginning to want to do something to protect his loved ones-his own home was only about twenty or thirty kilometers southeast-to want to fight and hurl back the enemy from the sacred soil of the Fatherland. His Frau. Frieda, and his nine-year-old son, lohann, and his own little five-acre farm were close by. In his dull, slow way Hans was determined to protect his loved ones. The war at last had become quite a personal thing to Hans.

He fought down his first feeling of panic as he watched them come-column of twos, one column on each side of the road. He thought of rushing to Sergeant Schulenberg with the information, but he quickly rejected the idea. Sergeant Schulenberg would just slap him down for leaving his post. Then he became calmly analytical. On the march into Grosheim he had amused himself by counting the number of steps between the trees lining the side of the road. They had averaged about twentyfive paces, or about twenty meters. He counted up the line of trees, one, two, three, up to the eleventh tree, deliberately set his sight at 200 meters, and with his rifle at his shoulder, waited. When the first American passed the eleventh tree he aligned his sights with the American's head resting just on the tip of the front sight, and holding his breath, he slowly squeezed the trigger. Hans felt the shock of the recoil and ducked into his hole. A few seconds later he cautiously raised his head to look. A wave of exultation swept over him. The American lay on the road,

motionless, between the ten and eleventh tree. Why, it was easy! In those few seconds Hans Mueller had become a killer. He cautiously and quietly opened his bolt, ejected the spent cartridge and slowly threw another round into the chamber. He expected a hail of fire to come any moment, but nothing happened. The Americans had disappeared from sight.

He looked down the bed of the canal. Sergeant Schulenberg was approaching at a crouch, his face set in a snarl, which was the way Hans usually saw him. "Dumbkopf, what are you firing for? At your shadow again? Haven't I told you to hold your fire until you have a target?" he whispered harshly.

Hans waited until Sergeant Schulenberg came to his position and wordlessly pointed to the dead body. Sergeant Schulenberg squinted intently at the road.

"Ah, das ist gut, das ist gut, but be very careful. Do not disclose your position." That was all Sergeant Schulenberg said. He crawled back up the canal and disappeared into the town.

Then the Americans finally started to fire. Most of the fire was high and into the town. It didn't bother Hans much; he knew that the Americans still had no idea where he was. He kept watching the road, and then he detected movement there. Another American was moving toward the dead one on the road. Again Hans raised his rifle. Again he took careful aim, this time aiming lower: the American was crouching. He squeezed the trigger until he felt the jar of the recoil. When he raised his head to look, the other American lay sprawled on the road. Surely, the Americans must have located his position by now. But their shots were no closer; their rate of fire had not increased. Perhaps little Hans had put one over on them after all. When Sergeant Schulenberg reappeared again he did not look so grim. Hans wordlessly pointed down to the road. Sergeant Schulenberg looked, and actually smiled. He patted Hans on the shoulder and said, "Good shooting, Mueller, keep it up." Hans grinned foolishly and said nothing. Perhaps Sergeant Schulenberg was not such a bad fellow after all.

HE returned again to his vigil. At first, he could detect no movement at all. But then here and there he saw the slight movement of a branch, a bit of dirt fly up, a portion of a man's body flash by a tree. He started to raise his rifle on two or three occasions when he saw these things but checked himself. He could not fire many more times

without being located, and he could not afford to shoot at anything that was not a sure target. He knew Americans. Once they even thought they had you spotted they would throw everything at you. Machine guns, mortars, artillery—everything. They didn't have to worry about saving ammunition. Then Hans had an inspiration. Franz Beuchner had a light machine gun position up in the cellar of the house just by the canal about seventy-five yards away. Franz would be in the biggest hole he could find, paying no attention to the gun at all. If he could get the machine gun,



give the Americans a few accurate bursts, maybe he could break up the attack that was surely coming. Hans rushed through the canal bed to the gun position. Sure enough, the gun was deserted. He got into position. There was more movement in the bush. Some weapon, probably a machine gun, was going into position by that tree. Men were moving up. He planned his fire carefully, taking aim first at each of his targets before he fired. Then he opened up in short staccato bursts. First, the bush; then the tree; then the line where he had seen the man moving. He was still firing when he felt an angry tap on his shoulder. It was Sergeant Schulenberg, and he was furious. "You fool. What are you trying to do? Who told you to fire that machine gun? Don't you know the Americans will open up with everything on us now?"

"But I thought . . ." Hans tried to break in

"You thought. You thought. You're not paid to think. I'll do the thinking around here. You see? They have started already." The American artillery preparation had begun. He slapped Hans sharply across the mouth. "Now

get back to your position. They will probably attack after this."

Hans wiped his hand across his mouth where a small trickle of blood had started. He crept back to his hole. Actually, Fate was kinder to Hans than he knew. The building which he and Sergeant Schulenberg just left suffered direct hits from both artillery and mortars. Franz Beuchner, who indeed had found the deepest hole in the building, was buried underneath a pile of rubble and debris.

When the American preparatory fires subsided Hans waited expectantly for the attack, but it never came. He wondered why.

Later he saw Americans moving on a small rise about 500 meters away near the road. He counted up his trees again: twenty-three, twenty-four, twenty-five. There was quite a group of Americans there now. He marvelled at how they had the nerve to stand around talking in the open like that. Encouraged by his former successes, he decided to shoot one shot at the group. One man in particular caught his attention. He appeared to be the center of attraction. Perhaps he was the leader. Hans carefully set his sight. He settled into a solid, comfortable firing position and taking his sight picture, which was quite indistinct this time, he even more slowly than before squeezed the trigger. When he looked for the results of his work this time he saw nothing except that the Americans had cleared out from the rise. He suddenly thought of Sergeant Schulenberg. What would he tell him this time. Sure enough the sergeant came down the canal bed looking as unpleasant as ever. Hans could think of nothing to tell him except the truth. The Sergeant's response was typical of what Hans had learned to expect.

"You never learn, do you Mueller? How did you ever expect to hit anything at that range? But since you are so anxious to fight you will man a listening post out there by the road tonight-all night, you understand? You will have ten rounds of rifle ammunition and two grenades; that is all." Sergeant Schulenberg left, taking all Hans' ammunition except the ten rounds of rifle and the two grenades. Hans shrugged philosophically. Oh, well, perhaps he could dig up a little more ammunition somewhere. He managed to find and hide away about thirty more rounds of rifle ammunition, three grenades, and about five land mines that someone had left in one of the buildings. After reporting to Sergeant Schulenberg and receiving the usual instructions, he was able

to sneak the ammunition to his post down near the road. This type of duty usually terrified Hans. It was lonely and frightening out there by yourself listening for the stealthy approach of the enemy, but this night somehow he didn't care. It was a very deadly German soldier that the American patrol met that night. He waited until he had the first shadowy figure exactly in his sights, before he blasted away. Then he thought he hit another one before the figures melted into the darkness. Later on in the night Hans thought he heard the rumble of tank motors. That made him remember the land mines. He crawled out and laid them by the road near a small culvert which had been blown, two on one side, three on the other. He dug a little hole with his bayonet for each mine and covered it carefully. Then he went back to his hole and slept fitfully for the rest of the night. Fortunately for Hans, Sergeant Schulenberg did not catch him sleeping or he would have been shot.

THE German garrison of Grosheim, held there by the iron will of Sergeant Schulenberg, waited all morning for the impending attack. When it did not come, many of the men even began to become a little cheerful, despite the bad food and the lack of any kind of fire support. Perhaps the Americans would by-pass Grosheim. Perhaps help would come. Then someone, listening intently, discerned a familiar and dreaded sound. "Jabos," he said. Shortly thereafter the entire town of Grosheim seemed to have been blown from under their feet. At the completion of the artillery preparation there were few Germans in Grosheim who were able or willing to serve their weapons. After the tanks and infantry had started to move the final few yards into Grosheim, there were only two who could and would fire at all: Sergeant Schulenberg and Private Mueller.

Hans had again escaped the major effects of the American air and artillery preparation. His position on the outskirts of the town was far enough away from the center of impact of most of the bombs and shells for him to be physically unharmed, although he was thoroughly shaken up. He was not so shaken up, however, that he couldn't fire his rifle when the American attack started. He fired it steadily and saw three or four Americans drop, but he was far too busy to evaluate the results of every shot. When it was obvious that the Americans were not going to be stopped, he dashed back up the canal



bed to the old machine gun position now in a pile of rubble. A soldier Hans did not know was manning the gun, but he seemed dazed; he wasn't even firing the gun, just looking at it as if he had never seen one before. Hans pushed him roughly aside and started to shoot. He had a glimpse of Sergeant Schulenberg velling like a madman and brandishing his pistol at a group of cowering, bedraggled looking soldiers behind another rubble pile. But Hans was too intent upon the job at hand to worry about Sergeant Schulenberg. He fired the gun in short, accurate bursts at the infantry accompanying the tanks. Eventually, the infantry stopped advancing; and then the tanks. Hans exulted. "We've stopped them again; we've done it again;" but his exultation was short-lived. The Americans started forward once more. He kept firing his gun at the fleeting targets, but still they kept coming. Suddenly, Hans realized that they were not

going to be stopped. Bullets were kicking up dust in front of his position now; it was a miracle he wasn't hit. Two bullets went through his tunic, one through the sleeve, one through the side, grazing his skin. The machine gun itself was hit several times. It was unbearable. Hans dived for his rifle at the bottom of his hole. He couldn't even surrender. He knew now that if he stood up at all he would be cut in two. He decided to play dead. He could hear the Americans shouting. He felt that there was someone in the remains of this very building! Instinctively he reached for his rifle, not to use it, but more for the reassurance that only his rifle could give him. He felt the rough, strong grasp of the American jerking him to his feet. Then the American-he was an Indian-was trying to take his rifle. Hans was dazed, stricken. Not his rifle! It was the only friend he had. He didn't want to shoot anybody any more. He just wanted to keep the rifle. But the American tore it from his grasp. Hans went completely to pieces then. All the tension of the past twenty-four hours, the bad food, the fear, the lack of rest, the shock, hit Hans all at once. He started to blubber and beg for mercy; he reverted to his old self; he babbled incessantly although nobody could understand him. Finally, when the Indian jumped at him he became terrified. He had seen Western movies where the Indians chased people in order to scalp them. The Indian was going to scalp him. He started to run blindly, wildly. If only they would just shoot him and get it over with. But not take his fine, curly hair. When he finally collapsed, a snivelling, shaking heap on the road-there he was, that pitiful subhuman creature-the man who had stopped the 1st Division.

Private John Mueller, U.S.A.

ANS MUELLER never knew the results or effects of his military exploits. Nobody did. He was rather ashamed of his capture and his breakdown afterwards, but after a hot meal, bath and a good rest he completely recovered. He was interrogated, but his interrogators were quickly convinced that he knew little of military value.

Hans did not stay a prisoner very long. He stayed long enough, however, to learn a little English, and to hear quite a bit about America. He liked what he heard. He never got there as a prisoner of war; the war ended too soon, but decided he would like to go

there. He and Frieda had an opportunity to work for an American official in the State Department as butler and maid, and they took it. Two years later the American said he could arrange for them to emigrate to the U.S.

Hans, Frieda and Johann arrived in America in the spring of 1948. He got a job as a waiter in a German restaurant in New York. He finally found an apartment on the East Side. It was not a tenement, but it was not a fashionable place, either. Frieda kept it very clean.

In the spring of 1953, young Johann, now called John, received his draft notice. John was the exact replica of his father, having the same dark curly hair, the large nose, the protruding ears. He was somewhat taller and heavier than Hans, a tribute perhaps to the more substantial diet he had in the United States, but he had many of the same personal characteristics as Hans. He was sloppy and he had a single-tracked mind. He did well in school in the subjects he liked, but ignored the others.

John had gone to a summer camp in the summer of 1951. One of the boys had a .22 rifle. He loaned it to John on one or two occasions, and John became quite attached to it; so attached to it, in fact, that he traded the boy some of his prized possessions for it, as boys will. He brought it home to show his father. Hans looked at it very carefully, peering in the chamber and down the bore, lining up the sights. John thought his father was quite pleased, but much to John's amazement Hans suddenly handed it back to him and said: "Get rid of it; it will only get you into trouble." John, like most people, never quite understood his father. He put the rifle away, and his father never saw it again.

John was not as apprehensive about his approaching career in the Army as his father. He liked America and in a vague way desired to do something for it, but like most of the youngsters he knew, nothing that would interfere too much with his personal life. He didn't expect to like the Army. Any day now, though, he will report to a training division, never dreaming that he is the son of a man who performed one of the greatest individual exploits of the war against the country whose uniform he will soon be wearing.

It Could Happen Here

P to now, this story has been entirely fictional. From now on, I don't intend that there shall be anything fictional about what I have to say. Good or bad, logical or illogical, true or untrue, the story brings out some very important military principles. The first of these is the importance of the individual soldier in combat.

Here was a man who stopped an entire division for twenty-four hours with nothing except his rifle, a few other weapons he happened to pick up on the battlefield, and a will and determination and knowledge or instinct that just seemed to occur to him for some reason or other at that particular time and place. Under the given circumstances and conditions, probably nothing short of an atomic bomb could have stopped that division-and maybe not even an atomic bomb. Well, you might say, those conditions and circumstances were tailormade by the author to bring out certain points; you can prove anything that way. That is true. But it is an unfortunate characteristic of infantry combat that it is extremely difficult to separate fact from fiction. Airplanes bring back pictures from gun cameras of enemy airplanes disintegrating in the air, of entire industrial plants being blown sky high. The Navy has photographic proof of the enemy's ships it sinks. But only the infantryman knows the paralyzing effect upon himself and his comrades of having a man drop not ten feet away with a bullet through his head, of having his leaders and his friends suddenly carried away feet first as a result of something he can hear but cannot see. And he doesn't even know that much about the effect of his fire on the enemy; he can only guess and hope, and maybe count



the bodies when he gets on the objective.

According to the story, of the forty-one casualties inflicted on George Company, Hans Mueller was directly responsible for forty. The other American casualty was Captain Stevens, wounded by Sergeant Schulenberg. Even the tank was knocked out by a mine laid by Hans Mueller. Anyone who has served with a combat infantry company knows that these are quite a few casualties for a company to suffer in twenty-four hours. I have used the 1st Infantry Divison in my story because it was the kind of division that could take such casualties

and still accomplish its mission. I believe it was representative of our best divisions; no better than yours or mine perhaps, but certainly a fine division by most standards. Whether it was twenty or 280 miles east of the Rhine on 26 April I do not know; I was on the other side of the world fighting the Japanese at the time. I do believe, however, that this could have happened to any U. S. division, in World War II. It was unusual, but not unique that one company should be the advance guard for a division. It was unusual, but not unique, that a small town or road center like Grosheim should assume the strategical or tactical importance that it did. It was neither unusual nor unique that a good company like George Company could be stopped the same way George Company was. The unique point of this story was that this feat was accomplished by one man, and even that may not have been unique. Who can say that one man could not have stopped his outfit for twenty-four hours under the circumstances and conditions that the 1st Division encountered that day?

BEFORE I entered combat I used to say, "This or that happened here in the problem today, but it could not have happened in combat." I don't say that any more, because I've learned that almost anything can happen in infantry combat. I should have said it could not have logically happened in combat, but it is the unfortunate lot of the soldier that he must fight the illogical as well as the logical. He is lucky or smart or both if he can figure out which is which. If the combat situation I have invented was indeed unique, can you name a real one which was not unique? The same is true of the character of Hans Mueller. In any case, I believe my story is one that could have happened, and in some shape or form possibly did.

It seems almost certain, however, that even if something like this did happen nobody would know about it. Poor Hans as well as many of his real-life counterparts is destined to live in oblivion, probably convinced that he was a failure as

a soldier

Had George Company known one man was the only effective fighting force opposing them they would have been in Grosheim within minutes after Corporal Rivera's death. Had Captain Stevens and Colonel Keats known that Sergeant Schulenberg had completely destroyed the German effectiveness as a fighting force by driving Hans away from the machine gun, George Company would have moved into Grosheim in less

than a few minutes-and without casualties. If General Appleton had not been hit, the division would probably have been on its objective six hours earlier. Perhaps most amazing of all, if Sergeant Schulenberg had sent every German soldier out of Grosheim except Hans Mueller, the Germans would have accomplished the same results with the loss of only one man. As it was, the presence of the demoralized and ineffective group saved the military reputation of an American division. Certainly there were plenty of dead bodies in Grosheim that day, the visible evidence, positive indentifications and POW reports that Grosheim was occupied by a battalion, which was true and was so stated in the division history. But the division objective was taken when they captured Hans Mueller.

So you see, so many things about infantry combat are unknown or misinterpreted or misunderstood that you are practically forced to resort to fiction to prove a point. Most accounts of actual battles turn out to be mostly that anyhow.

Whether one man could have achieved the results achieved by our mythical Hans Mueller is beside the point. If it took three or four like Hans, or a dozen, or even a hundred, to do the job he did that day, it must be admitted that such people are extremely valuable. Divisions are not stopped by airplanes or battleships or totally even by artillery; they are stopped by men, mainly riflemen. With all the divisions we have to stop, we are going to need a lot of riflemen, a lot of damn good riflemen. They all won't be fortunate-or unfortunate -enough to find themselves in the same situation as Hans Mueller, but it stands to reason that if we have enough good riflemen, there may be a few who will find themselves in similar situations and be able to do what he did, even though we may never know about it.

NOTHER military point which this story illustrates is leadership, good and bad. Sergeant Schulenberg, for example, was one of the leaders in the story. He was a sergeant that most officers, German and American, would give their eve teeth to have. Yet it is hard to see how there could have been a more ineffective leader than Sergeant Schulenberg on the battlefield. Private Mueller was effective despite Sergeant Schulenberg rather than because of him. This is a pretty severe condemnation of any leader, since the objective of a leader is to make all of his men effective fighters. Why did he fail? His men's morale was low; according to his

standards they were a pretty poor bunch of men, anyhow. Was it his fault he failed? You can bet your life it was.

You'll remember that a good bit of Schulenberg's leadership was based on fear-fear of Sergeant Schulenberg. We Americans don't subscribe to the theory of leadership through fear. We say that a leader should be fair, considerate of his men, courageous in the face of danger, loval, determined, and so on, just as we say a scout is trustworthy, loyal, cheerful, helpful, friendly. . . . All very true. I'm all for it, just as I'm against sin. But why is leadership based on fear faulty? A man who gets things done by having his men scared not to do them because of fear of him still accomplishes his mission, doesn't he? And in most cases whether we admit it or not he gets it done more thoroughly, more quickly, and more efficiently than by other methods. We have leaders in our Army, commissioned and non-commissioned, who will frankly tell you that the way



to run an outfit is to get 'em scared to death of you. So why isn't leadership based on fear of the leader generally sound? Sergeant Schulenberg's failure tells us why it isn't.

He had a bunch of scared men under his command in Grosheim. There are hardly any other men than scared men in battle and these men had more reason to be scared than most. In addition to the terrifying air and artillery concentrations they had Sergeant Schulenberg to be scared of.

We have seen how ineffective all this was. Only one man fought. Sergeant Schulenberg ignored or didn't know that: You can lead a soldier to battle but you can't make him fight. Very scared

men do not fight as well as only partially scared men. When the normal fears and strains of battle are compounded by the fear of the leader, men's battle efficiency must be correspondingly reduced. That is why Sergeant Schulenberg failed. That is why leadership based on fear is not a sound principle. But do you read that in our field manuals or in our doctrine on leadership? You do not. And as long as you don't tell 'em a good sound reason for rejecting it there are going to be leaders who, while possibly giving lip service otherwise, are going to deliberately apply leadership through fear. I think we should tell 'em why it will fail them when the chips are down.

Sergeant Schulenberg was a master of unessential details. There are people in our Army who will thunder at this. There are no unessential details in the Army! All details are important! Minute attention to detail is one of the most important characteristics of good leadership! I agree, but it must be admitted, I think, that some details are more important than others. And it also must be admitted that a good leader must be able to discern between the essential and the unessential, or if you will, between the essential and the more essential. Most of us have had the experience of working for someone who is such a stickler for detail that nothing ever gets done. Usually these people are found on a staff. I say this, not because I have anything against staff officers generally, but because details are important in staff

Sergeant Schulenberg never realized that Hans Mueller, since he was sloppy, couldn't remember things, looked and acted servile and shifty, could be, and in fact proved himself to be, a good soldier on the battlefield. Although the Sergeant was after Hans constantly about other details, he missed completely the all important fact that Hans had somehow learned how, when, and where to fire his rifle and other weapons effectively. That is something he should have known about Hans had he forgotten every other detail about him. Perhaps what Sergeant Schulenberg really lacked was a basic understanding of human nature. But he was interested in efficiency, not human nature. In his determined efforts to get this efficiency he forgot the main element that makes military efficiency: the human being. A lot of reasons have been advanced for Germany's defeat. Not the least of these, in my opinion, was because they had too many Schulenbergs and not enough

But perhaps we should not be too

critical of Sergeant Schulenberg unless we are sure we can do better ourselves. American leadership as illustrated in this story was not bad. It was not intended to be, anyway. I think it was fairly typical of American military leadership in World War II. I don't believe that a leader whose solution to every military problem in combat is to give his subordinates hell every time they are held up is a good leader. Colonel Galloway was the closest approach to this type in the story. But he had the re-

deeming grace of rewarding his battalion commander who took the objective with a token of his confidence and appreciation. Providing he was as fair with all his battalion commanders, I believe they would be willing to swear by him despite occasional bursts of temper or impatience. Often good leadership manifests itself after a battle as well as before and during it. I hope the story brings this out, too. But we can always improve the standards of our leadership: let there be no doubt about that.



What Can We Do About It?


WE now have the problem of Hans' Nson, John Mueller. We will have to handle him better than the Germans did Hans, because it is not likely that John, being Americanized, will overcome all the obstacles Hans did to become a good soldier. John, too, will be sloppy, forgetful, a little slow about some things, apparently not too interested in anything military except his rifle. Will we give him the "eight-ball" treatment? Will we have a sergeant who will tell his platoon leader: "Private Mueller came out to inspection today without his shoes shined; the other day he forgot his insignia; he's always doing something like that. But I'd like to keep him in my squad, sir; he's trying. And I think we can make a soldier out of him. Somehow I think that boy is going to be all right in combat."

I'm not so sure our sergeant is going to take that attitude. I'm not so sure I would, either. I don't like sloppy soldiers, and I don't like forgetful ones. Contrary to any impression I may have created, I am not of the namby-pamby school of leadership. We could use non-commissioned officers with some of the characteristics of Sergeant Schulenberg and even some of his methods, including the use of force, providing it is controlled. For example, if the sergeant finds Private Mueller drunk in public, orders him back to barracks, and finally

has to give him a black eye or beat him up to get him back there, the sergeant should be backed up and no questions asked. But if the sergeant decides to "take Mueller behind the barracks" because Mueller dirtied the barracks or his bed wasn't made properly the sergeant should be busted, court-martialed, and railroaded out of the outfit; beating a man up is not a reasonable punishment for the delinquency. I realize it would be difficult for an officer to find out how Mueller got his black eye, but both officers and non-commissioned officers should understand the difference in leadership methods. One thing they have got to understand is that their job is to get Private Mueller with his weapon on the battlefield, and that Private Mueller will be willing and able to use that weapon properly. Private Mueller can do it if we don't 368 him first, if we don't spoil him by bad leadership; if we have the proper sense of leadership values when we lead him into combat through combat, and after combat. I don't think our leadership training tells us this. We are given a number of vague generalities, heretofore mentioned, about qualities of a leader, but we don't tell the young leader how to understand Private Mueller or how to get the most out of him. He doesn't need a course in psychology. He doesn't need lectures or manuals or even the new code of military justice. He just needs some sound guidance, a thorough knowledge of his mission, and a lot of practice in practical leadership out from behind the desk. We should see that he gets all of these. I'm not sure we are doing it.

THE final point illustrated by my story is that training in the care and use of weapons and in the development of combat initiative is all important. There is nothing more essential than teaching a soldier how to use his weapon and instilling in him the will and initiative to use it. We know this, of course, and try to teach him, but we try to teach him so many other things these two vital subjects are often lost in the shuffle. Some of our finest minds have figured out that so many training hours should be devoted to rifle marksmanship, so many hours to squad tactics, so many hours to I&E, and so on. But do these people know how long it will take Private Mueller to learn to shoot? An infantryman should be taught to shoot whether it takes eight hours or eighty, or even more.

How would you find the time? Here is one way to solve that problem. At the Infantry School, in teaching new instructors they show a chart which is simply an ordinary target like this:



They tell the instructor, in preparing his subject to be sure to include the points in the bull's-eye in his presentation. Then if there is time, include the "should know" points, and then if more time is available, the "nice to know" points. Why don't we follow this principle in our training? Put rifle marksmanship, appropriately enough, right in the center of the bull's eye. Put subjects like TI&E, C-B-R warfare, the Chaplain's hour, orderly room hour, in the outside ring-"nice to know." Until the soldier reached a desired standard, say sharpshooter, on the rifle range and an equivalent standard on the transition range and other "need to know" subjects, he would not spend any time on the "nice to know" subjects at all. When he does reach those standards, in the "need to know" and "should know" subjects, he will take a required number of hours in the "nice to know" subjects, and if possible, more if he so desires. To the TI&E people who may object, I would ask: What is the use of teaching a man why he fights, if he doesn't know how to fight? To the C-B-R people I would say: There is nothing a soldier absolutely needs to know about chemical warfare except to put on and take off his gas mask, and he can do that on the way to and from the rifle range. I would tell the chaplains that the best one of them I ever saw was one who instead of requesting more of the men's scheduled time, went out in the field, on the range, or anywhere else a group of men were assembled, talked to them there, and incidentally, participated in their training, too. To the "Orderly Room Hour" enthusiasts, I would tell them what one of my former company commanders said: "My men know that my door is open or I am available at my CP or even at home if they want to see me. They don't need a special hour for it." I realize that this would spoil a lot of pretty training charts in a lot of headquarters, but such a system would improve our training and give our young commanders some responsibilities and an opportunity to use some judgment and initiative in training their men. They have little enough at the present time.

In rifle marksmanship training, all "dry" work would be done on the range itself. When a man learned his sight

picture, sling adjustment, and trigger squeeze, and a few fundamentals about positions, and thought he was ready to shoot, he would shoot. There would be no such thing as "instructional practice" and record practice." He would learn to zero his rifle and then he would fire a regular course. Every time he fired, it would be for record. When he reached the desired standard, he would coach, or be ready for a "should know" subject.

You say: "Well, anyone could make expert that way." But isn't that exactly what we want? We are trying to teach as many infantrymen as possible to learn to shoot, not make it tough for them to earn a marksmanship medal. To supply economy experts who claim we can't afford that much ammunition, I would say, cancel a few USO shows, or give us the money saved from a flight of airplanes being scratched be-

cause of weather, and we can buy that ammunition. It doesn't take so much money compared to a lot of things we spend money for, and the results are worth it if we can produce infantrymen who can hit what they are aiming at.

ALL this is getting a little far away from our story of Hans and John Mueller, except that, you remember, both Hans and John liked to shoot and liked rifles. John liked his own rifle, that is. Most American soldiers in this day and age, unfortunately, think of their rifles and other weapons as just pieces of hardware until they get into combat. In the old Indian-fighting days a scout had a pet name for his rifle and talked to it like a human being. Those days are gone forever. In the Army it may be good riddance, but that love of a man for his weapon could well be retained; we haven't got it now and our military system doesn't encourage it. We give a man a rifle, probably full of cosmoline, possibly already pitted from improper care, tell him it belongs to the government, costs \$80. You clean it, we tell him, and if you lose it, you pay for it; if it doesn't work, bring it back and we'll give you another one. The man cleans it for inspections; but no inspection, no clean rifle. If you don't believe it, inspect your outfit's rifles some Saturday morning after a week on the range, when many of the men are on pass. The rifles you inspect in ranks will be clean, but get a few

from the racks assigned to those who went on pass. You will find a lot of men who shouldn't go on pass again for a long time. When we issue a man a rifle it should be in perfect condition, preferably a new one. We should give him that rifle, and tell him he owns it. If he stays in the infantry he'll keep it. If he is honorably discharged he can take it with him, or he can sell it back to the government. It is his badge as an infantryman, the one item of equipment that belongs to him, not the government.

The government will teach him how to shoot it, and how to care for it, but from then on the responsibility is his. There'll be no price tag on this weapon. It may be worth his life some day. If it doesn't function, it is not worth a plugged nickel. If it is found dirty or neglected, it will be taken away from him for a time. That will be his punishment. If necessary he can carry something heavier in the meantime, but if it has to be taken away permanently he is unworthy to be an infantryman. Those who are assigned to crew-served weapons can turn in their rifles and store them, but they can draw them out again any time. I believe this would restore our infantrymen's respect for rifles and for themselves. I believe John Mueller would respond to such a system nobly.

F soldiers have confidence in their weapons and their ability to use those weapons they should have the initiative

> to use them properly on the battlefield. They should, but they don't-at least a large portion of them don't, according to S. L. A. Marshall. The American soldier is assumed to have more initiative than other soldiers, because he is brought up in a free country, is accustomed to exercising his own free will and determining his own destiny. This may be true with regard to some of his military activities but not necessarily on the battlefield. Combat initiative is what makes the individual soldier close with the enemy and destroy him. Frequently this impetus is provided by junior officers and non-commissioned officers. Occasionally individual infantrymen catch the spark and transmit it to an entire outfit. But these are exceptional instances. Mostly our soldiers demonstrate initiative by figuring out how to make their work easier. 1 do not say this sarcastically,



because it is certainly militarily advantageous to save energy for major efforts. But I think we deceive ourselves if we believe that they display much combat initiative in the very elemental business of hunting down the enemy and destroying him with their individual weapons. I also think it is a fallacy to believe that our training is best conceived to accomplish this purpose.

WE can train a great many people quickly and more or less efficiently, but we train them as a mass, using mass production methods. In modern combat soldiers do not operate in a mass. If they do, they suffer excessive casualties. If their leaders attempt to eliminate mass formations but still attempt to control their men the same as they would mass formations, the leaders suffer excessive casualties. I think Korea has re-emphasized this fact. The solution, of course, is to instill in the individual soldier the initiative and will to accomplish his mission in extended formations more or less free of the control of his leader. But obvious as this solution is, it just won't happen automatically and the type of training necessary to achieve it is not simple. To say that I have the complete solution would be self-deluded conceit. But I have some suggestions which I think would help.

First, we should remember the principle which Sergeant Schulenberg never knew and wouldn't have believed anyway: You can lead a soldier to battle, but you can't make him fight. Tell the soldier that. On the battlefield the occasions are exceptional when he can be told when or where to shoot, and except in a very general way, when and where to move. He supposedly has learned how to move and shoot. The rest is up to him. This appears simple, but in combat it gets complicated. If he is in doubt about when and where to shoot, which is normal on the battlefield, the time to shoot is usually when he gets shot at by small arms. The place to shoot at is where he would be if he were the enemy shooting back. His best position is where he can best shoot and stay protected at the same time. If he shoots well enough so that the enemy can't shoot back, he needs less protection: the more he shoots, the safer he is, providing he shoots well enough to keep the enemy from shooting back; the closer he is to the enemy, the more chances he has to hit the target. So it is usually best to move toward the enemy. There, in a few simple words, is nearly all the individual soldier needs to know about fire and movement and tactics. I think we should keep telling him

something like this, send him through tactical exercises with a minimum of control to show him how it works. Surely, the enemy should be enveloped when possible and attacked from the flank or the rear, but that is usually a problem of his leaders, not his. Almost invariably, when he attacks, he will attack frontally because the enemy he attacks has nothing more to do than turn himself and his weapon in his tracks. On his own initiative the rifleman must be the sole judge of how, when, and where to fire his weapon and where to move to do it. We should train him to do this.

After the soldier has learned how to fire his weapon his responsibility for the safety of himself and his comrades should be emphasized. In our system of training, from the time a man puts the first round in his rifle until he finally enters combat, there is a safety officer hovering over him to see that his bolt is open, his rifle is pointed the right way, or his safety is on. I hope our high regard for human life never changes, and I believe every precaution should be taken to protect each soldier. But we emphasize safety in our training to such an extent that many of our soldiers are more afraid of our own fire than that of the enemy. In my opinion, many of our safety precautions are entirely unnecessary. I don't have the complete solution to this problem, but some time in the final stages of his training before entering combat, the soldier should go through a firing problem in which he and the other members of his unit are the only safety control officials. There are no safety officers on the battlefield.

HANS MUELLER did not have the benefits of this type of training. He wasn't even a citizen of a free country. But he was a success in battle, at least in one battle. Certain qualities existed in Hans Mueller which made him a good soldier. On the surface, Hans was pretty hopeless, but probably nowhere is it more difficult to dig beneath the superficial in a man's character and discover and develop his true value than in the infantry. It is difficult in training because soldiers in training never are tested as they are in combat. It is difficult in combat because everyone is too busy or excited to realize how other men react to the test of combat. I regret to say I do not know whether there were any Hans Muellers in my own outfit during the war. I had to resort to fiction to find him. Yet he is very real to me now and I am sure he exists-or existed. I am equally sure that his son, John, is entering our Army today, or thousands just like him are entering it, and we must develop the military potentialities of John Mueller to the maximum.

We should not forget the story of Hans Mueller, who alone with his infantry weapons stopped the 1st Division for twenty-four hours. Nor should we forget that properly trained, equipped and led, his son will do as well as his father. We should not let the American people forget it. But above all, we should not let him forget it.





The first repatriated Americans arrive at Freedom Village

The first newspaper stories about American prisoners who had turned against their comrades in arms and had joined the Communist cause were chilling in the deliberate matter-of-factness with which the repatriated Americans made the charges and the press reported them. But within a matter of bours there were second thoughts and fuller reporting. The press began to dig behind the news, and the possibility that all this was another example of the evil methods the Communists use to turn son against father, friend against friend, and nation against nation, began to appear in the newspapers. The report of Lieutenant Gough C. Reinhardt is followed and supported by Edward Hunter, the author of Brain Washing in Red China, Lieutenant Reinhardt's thoughtful reflections of a young officer on the spot, and Mr. Hunter's clear explanation of what the Communists are up to give us an understanding of the meaning of the tragic stories that came from Freedom Village.

Letter from Freedom Village

Frame-Up, Communist Style

LIEUTENANT GOUGH C. REINHARDT

The following is excerpted from a letter of a soldier-son to his soldier-father, Colonel George C. Reinhardt.

WHEN the truce came I turned my counter-battery radar set over to a new lieutenant and joined Operation Big Switch at Freedom Village. My job consists of supervising an identification section in the processing of returning prisoners. We have cards prepared and personal data sheets on known POWs and MIAs—even fingerprint cards in case there's any doubt about identities.

It's a very satisfying job, watching men come alive and believe they're free again. A few almost break down. Others refuse to believe they are free at first. They've had so many disappointments they won't let themselves accept it. They think there must be a catch somewhere.

Unusual reactions are not as marked among the Americans as the poor ROKs. Whole shipments of these lads get off the trucks begging permission to send a last message to their families before we shoot them for having been taken prisoner. When we convince 'em they are free, and returning heroes, these impassive Orientals break down completely.

The majority of those being repatriated look pretty good, especially when we compare them to pictures of men coming back from Japanese POW camps in 1945. The evidence seems to point to harsher treatment by the North Koreans and in the early days of the Chinese participation. Some men show evidence of beatings and poorly treated wounds. But for the last six months or so things were better. Except for old

First Lieutenant Gough C. Reinhardt, Artillery, was an enlisted man from 1945 to 1947. He then attended Purdue University, from which he graduated in 1950. He was commissioned in the Regular Army in June of the same year. scars of past mistreatment among the men who survived, and the certain knowledge that only God knows how many did not, there isn't too much to complain about now. The Commies have been preparing for Big Switch in their own fashion.

It's on the mental side that the Reds have shown their unbelievably clever cruelty. They played their hands so well that accounts of Communist brutality are almost crowded out of the news by charges, among our own people, running from collaboration to treachery. I can imagine the headlines in the papers back home: "treason, informers, collaborators" and that sort of sensational stuff. Makes priceless publicity for the Reds' smartest, and dirtiest, propaganda since the Korean mess started.

ET me show you how it looks over here. Suppose I had been a prisoner. The Chinks said I had joined up with them. Would you believe it?

Right! They had that figured. But suppose my buddies accused me of ratting on them and going Red. What would you think then?

Let's make it worse. Suppose I didn't come back at all. The returnees report I'd stayed behind from choice. No doubt of my guilt in their minds. How would that hit you?

From what I've seen in my little corner of Big Switch there may be quite a few families in the U.S.A. facing exactly that brand of hell, the vast majority of them victims of a damnable frame-up. More serious to our country, though less personally tragic, is the loss of faith and our distrust in the ability of American soldiers to resist Red ideology.

Yet the whole thing is mainly lies; clever lies. For example, the bulk of the stories we hear first hand (NOT through the newspapers) prove that prisoners from one camp are convinced that men in another camp were all collaborators. Every little group was strictly isolated. Negroes were segregated from their white comrades. All received a steady diet of "party line" and false "news of the world."

Those men believe what they tell us about "squealers." Why not? The Reds beat 'em up and gave them a rough time. Then the sly insinuation: "Remember Joe Blow? He told us all about your food stealing, your escape plans. We put him in a luxury camp where you could be too if you'd cooperate."

Maybe that won the Chinks an occasional convert, some poor sick devil who couldn't take it any longer. If so, it was sheer bonus. The real pay-off they

worked for—and the newspapers are the innocent paymasters—was spreading hatred and distrust among our own people.

Who really knows, except some stinking commissar and his goons, what really happened to poor Joe Blow? Wasn't he shot in the back of his head and tossed into a ditch; no more a traitor than you or I? Even if he survived to appear in another group of returnees, what proof have his buddies that he ratted? Only the "sacred" word of a Communist official. Are you beginning to get the possibilities?

I remember our months together in Berlin. The Reds over here are the same type of animal we watched operate in the Soviet Zone. You'll remember how they turned kidnapped German technicians into "volunteer" workers for the Eastern zone. They even produced the men, without a mark on 'em, to verify their signatures on the "contracts." Sure they did. The Reds had his wife and kids and he knew what that meant. Sure, he'd verify his signature.

That was clever work in a dirty way. We've just had a new lesson in their cleverness over here. The Nazis were amateurs by comparison. They bought collaborators. The Reds frame theirs.

That's the only way the picture makes sense. All the history books I've read told me about only two American traitors, Benedict Arnold and *The Man Without a Country*. Why should we suddenly be afflicted with a whole batch of traitors out of a few hundred sick, crippled, and undernourished ex-prison-

During World War II the Japs were

at least as brutal as the Reds. Yet the Japanese managed to win a bare handful of collaborators from many times the number of prisoners to work on. How, then, could the Commies do it?

THE answer is simple. They didn't. They staged a super frame-up. And we seem to have fallen for it. Reminds me of my basic course in military justice: "... rape is a most detestable crime... but it must be remembered that it is an accusation easy to be made, hard to be proved, but harder to be defended by the party accused, though innocent."

Maybe when the proper officials have a chance to interview the GIs who "chose" to stay on the Red side of the fence, we'll come closer to honest answers. But in every case where the alleged "traitor" isn't alive to be questioned I'll be damned if we should convict him in absentia or whatever the legal term may be.

As for those very few who have come back to be *specifically* accused by their buddies . . . well, that is serious; like the rape charge. But the same book on military justice requires a thorough investigation by a competent, unbiased officer before a case can come to trial. I know the Army hasn't tried anybody or even put in charges so far as I know.

The whole thing is so disturbing that we almost forget the good side of the picture. Processing runs pretty smoothly and fast. One returnee claimed to be his best friend instead of himself. Schizoid tendency, said the medic. We got him straightened out with the same kindly doc's help.

By the author of "Brain Washing in Red China"

Our POWs Are Not Traitors

EDWARD HUNTER

This article is reprinted by permission from The New Leader of 24 August 1953.

CHALK up another big success for international Communism's propaganda apparatus. As American soldiers have returned from captivity in Korean prison camps, the people of America and other free countries have been stunned to hear many of them accused by their comrades of turning informers, of betraying their country. The Communists have been broadcasting every detail of these accusations to their subject peoples as a warn ing not to get "dangerous thoughts" and then expect help from the "decadent American imperialists."

But the shocking part of all this is not what happened in the POW camps. Rather, what is so frightening is the way in which the explanation of these events has failed to reach the American public.

The truth of the matter is that, ex-



U. S. soldiers in Communist prison camp. This photograph was made by Associated Press photographer Frank Noel in 1952 when he was a Communist captive.

cept for a small percentage who acted from purely opportunistic motives, these so-called "progressives" are to be pitied as sick men, not condemned as traitors. For the Chinese Communists operated the prisoner-of -war camps as huge brainwashing centers, applying the sinister totalitarian technique based on advanced methods of psychiatry, evangelism and indoctrination combined with physical violence, both subtle and crude.

No human brain can resist such a mind-control strategy indefinitely. We should have realized this as long ago as 1936, when former Russian Communist leaders abjectly confessed to the most fantastic crimes in the first Moscow purge trials. And anyone not convinced then should have had any further doubts removed by such postwar examples as Cardinal Mindszenty, Robert Vogeler and the Maryknoll Father who escaped from Red China to tell how, under the pressure of brain-washing, he had literally begun to doubt that he was actually a priest.

Surely no one deserved to be given all these facts more than did the American soldiers who, if captured, faced exposure to the Communist techniques. Yet, the first these men knew of brainwashing was when it was inflicted on them. They had no way of recognizing it, and, as a result, were led like sheep to the slaughter.

MERICAN newsmen and Government officials have referred to this mind pressure by any number of terms. They have called it persuasion, propaganda, indoctrination—everything but brain-washing. This has meant misleading the public. There are many words used to describe normal efforts to make a person change his point of view or accept a fact—for example, education, public relations, psychology, propaganda. Brain-washing, however, constitutes no single one of these, but a combination of all, combined with the most refined physical and moral pressure.

The returning American POWs should be told that the only difference between themselves and those they are denouncing as traitors is that the latter had less mental stamina or, perhaps, were singled out by the Communists for more intensive pressure. Most of those who succumbed to brain-washing are ill men and should be treated as such. Their comrades should regard them as they would any other victims of so-called "battle fatigue."

WHAT made brain-washing so insidious in its effects on the wholly unprepared American prisoners was the manner in which the Communists initiated it in the guise of normal military interrogation. The captured soldier expected to be interrogated, and he suspected nothing when the questions began. What he was undergoing, however, was a screening process. The Communists were sounding out the likes and dislikes, the past experiences and present prejudices of the men in order to determine the types of minds with which they had to deal.

Our knowledge of brain-washing techniques as employed in China itself, whether to extract "confessions" or to convert the victim, enables us to list some of the standard features. One is the use of hunger, perhaps merely in the form of a calculated diet deficiency. Another is the inducing of fatigue by forcing the individual to overtax his strength in something he might ordinarily enjoy doing, such as sports. And, of course, all this takes place in an atmosphere of complete uncertainty-as to why one is held, what one's fate is to be and what is occurring in the outside world -coupled with a measured dosage of threats and frequently, violence.

Goebbels had a trick that consisted in making certain that every piece of propaganda he put out contained ninetenths truth. Camouflaged in this manner, the vital one-tenth lie stood a better chance of gaining acceptance. The Communist brain-washers have greatly improved this technique. They see to it that all the details are true; the trick is to rearrange these details in a new pattern so that they seem to add up to a preconceived conclusion that is totally false. By this time, the hungry, weary, bewildered victim-as the Rev. John D. Hayes, who underwent brain-washing, has explained it to me-has lost the capacity to distinguish fact from fancy and is prepared to accept almost anything his tormentors tell him.

WHEN the word "brain-washing" first Rappeared in this country and its techniques were disclosed, the Communist reaction was most curious. Instead of a barrage of attacks and attempts at refutation, there was utter silence. The Communists had good reason for this. Knowledge of brain-washing and how it is inflicted serves as a preventive. Had our soldiers known of it before their capture, they could have resisted the Communist pressures or else made their captors' task so difficult that they would have abandoned it in most cases as not worth the effort. Hence, the Communists were interested not in discrediting the brain-washing revelations but in hushing them up; any discussion, favorable or unfavorable, was damaging to their cause.

Continued silence and confusion on the subject of brain-washing only serves the Communists' ends. It is time the full story was told of this ultimate refinement of totalitarian contempt for the individual.

THE NEW OFFICER EFFICIENCY REPORT

MAJOR GENERAL WILLIAM E. BERGIN

0N 31 October 1953 a new Officer Efficiency Report, DA Form 67-3, is scheduled to replace Form 67-2 as the instrument for rating all officers of the Army.

Both sides of the new Form 67-3 are shown on following pages. It was developed with the assistance of thousands of officers representing every branch and grade of the officer corps, including all general officers on active duty.

Before the first postwar efficiency report, Form 67-1, was adopted in 1947, it had extensive technical pretesting. Its technical effectiveness had been checked; the ratings produced were found to be statistically sound. Unfortunately, however, Form 67-1 had a serious shortcoming: most officers didn't like it.

Objections were raised on a number of counts, especially to the forced-choice section which required the rater to choose among the particular descriptive alternatives offered. In 1950 it was replaced with one containing no forced-choice section. This was Form 67-2, then in process of development, and when adopted, intended only for interim

N developing our newest efficiency report the first consideration was that we should profit as much as possible from the experience and thinking of the officers in the field and still retain the necessary degree of technical adequacy. Consequently, a questionnaire was prepared and sent out. Replies were received from about 1300 officers at seven major Army headquarters. These officers, representing each branch of the Army and in all grades from warrant officer to colonel, completed the questionnaire; the great majority of them, however, were captains, majors, and lieutenant colonels.

What were the responses of the offi-

cers to the questionnaire, and to what use was this information put?

Of the four rating scales used in Form 67-2, three were preferred over suggested alternatives covering the same content. These three were therefore proposed for the new Form 67-3 in substantially the same form as in 67-2: Desirability in Various Capacities, Performance of Duty, and Overall Value to the Service. A new scale was developed to cover the topic of promotability.

Several capacities were listed in Form 67-2 under Desirability in Various Capacities (Section II of Form 67-3). The commenting officers approved each of these by percentages ranging from 54 to 93. A number of recommendations, however, were made. Some wanted a new capacity, "Represent your headquarters in joint boards and other services, civilian agencies, or allied forces"; this was added to the new Form 67-3. Others recommended that "Teach in a classroom situation" be made more general; this heading was changed to "Conduct military instruction." The suggestion "Serve as your deputy" was added to assignment H so that the new heading reads, "Make decisions and take action in your name during your absence, e.g., act as your

On Form 67-2, desirability in each capacity was rated in terms of five step levels: "not want him," "take a chance on him," "happy to have him," "prefer him to most," and "particularly desire to have him."

This set of levels was offered in the questionnaire for comparison with four alternative sets. The set used in Form 67-2 was by far the preferred of the five sets. It was therefore retained in the new form with some modifications. "Take a chance on him" was changed to "would prefer others"; "happy to have him" became "pleased to have him."

N general, scales with step levels in descriptive terms, such as the set just discussed, were preferred over numerical scales. Officers also offered suggestions for equalizing the intervals between adjacent step levels in several of the scales.

The promotability scale of Form 67-2 was the only one the officers questioned did not favor over alternate scales presented with it. But none of the alternate promotability scales was generally approved either. The most acceptable alternate was favored by less than half of the commenting officers. As a result, all five scales were discarded, and an entirely new promotability scale was developed incorporating the suggestions and comments made by the officers.

Obviously, not all the recommendations of the responding officers could be incorporated in the new Form 67-3. Some desires were in conflict with other more deeply felt needs. A few were contrary to Army policy.

A TENTATIVE form of the new efficiency report, based largely on information from the questionnaire, was given field tryouts to check its technical adequacy, to find out if it were statistically sound. The proposed form was used at six field installations to rate officers on the job. These ratings were then compared with independent research measures of performance of the same officers. The agreement was close, indicating that the new form is an effective instrument for rating the efficiency of officers.

CINCE there were changes made as a result of the field trials, it was decided to check officer reaction again in a follow-up questionnaire. A questionnaire was prepared and sent to every general officer on active duty at the time (May 1952). General officers were asked to comment because their extensive experience would effectively supplement the earlier judgments of the officers in the lower grades. The followup questionnaire contained the same scales and questions that appeared in the earlier one. It also presented a summary of the information gained from the earlier survey. Each general officer was asked to comment on the several scales or to propose alternate scales.

There was no one section of the efficiency report singled out by the general officers for criticism or recommended changes. Rather there was consistent agreement on the overall acceptability of the rating scales. All of them were approved, outright or with minor changes, by close to 90 per cent of the general officers.

It was then adopted.

MAJOR GENERAL WILLIAM E. BERGIN, a former infantryman, is The Adjutant General of the Army.

FIRST PAGE OF THE NEW EFFICIENCY REPORT. THE SECOND (REVERSE) PAGE IS REPRODUCED ON THE NEXT PAGE


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DA 1 OCT 53 67-3

REPLACES DA AGO FORM 67-2, 1 SEP 80, WHICH WILL BE OBSOLETE 31 OCT 83.

THIS IS THE REVERSE SIDE OF THE NEW OFFFICERS' EFFICIENCY REPORT

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A Soviet officers' club heard a lecture on the theme: "The American Army is an army of pillage, murder and enslavement."

WHAT THE RUSSIANS SAY ABOUT HOW WE FIGHT

Soviet propagandists don't have to be ordered to distort history; they've got it all twisted up already

CAPTAIN GARRETT UNDERHILL

THE lies about America that are spouted by Radio Moscow and published in *Pravda* and the rest of the Communist press are so fantastic that we Americans refuse to believe that any part of the rest of the world could accept them as truth, or that the Communists themselves believe what they are saying to each other.

We are beginning to learn though, incredible as it may be, that some people in some parts of the world do accept the word from Moscow. Having learned this in a most painful and costly way, maybe we ought to look into the possibility that the Communists believe what they say about us.

A good starting place is to see what the Soviet military leaders have to say about our methods of waging war. This is a rewarding field because we soldiers can square what they say about our strategical and tactical doctrines against our books. And we can also put what they say up against their own doctrines, providing we know what those doctrines are.

The Soviets have said a lot about our methods of fighting a war and most of it is critical of our adherence to strong air and sea forces, as our sole possession (at the time) of atomic weapons, at the alleged unwillingness of the average American to mix it up and play rough on the ground battlefield, and at our military leadership.

CAPTAIN GARRETT UNDERHILL, MI-USAR, is a magazine writer who has served several tours of active duty. Everyone must know by now that the Russians insist the Red Army defeated the Germans and that Allied sea, air and ground power had little to do with the final result.

For example, the voluminous factual reports of the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey have been dismissed in the Soviet military press as "falsification of history" right down to the squad and ship level "to prove at all costs the 'chief' role of the U.S. Navy and Air Force in the defeat of Japan." And similarly a Soviet Air Force general said in 1948 that U.S. air attacks on German cities were made because it "accorded with the interests of American monopolies not to complete the military destruction of Germany."

OUR appreciation of sea power is incomprehensible to the Russians. In their view Mahan's theory of sea command is one of the "obviously obsolete theoretical positions" to which U.S. naval authorities obstinately cling. In Soviet theory this has been replaced with a concept called "the Zone of Naval Superiority." Writing in a top-level Soviet organ back in 1946 Admiral Alafuzov "demonstrated" that the days of "independent" sea power were over. Control of the seas was best exercised by a power controlling a great land mass with great depth, he wrote.

Soviet military leaders have been consistently critical of what they call America's emphasis on "air-atomic power." In 1946 a General Galaktionov warned that "the idea that power politics can be founded on air mastery is a delusion." On Red Army Day in 1951 Marshal Sokolovsky (the present Soviet Chief of Armed Forces Staff), then Deputy War Minister, condemned America's "thoroughly adventurous doctrines of atomic war.' The next year the then Chief of Staff Shetemenko inveighed against America's "theories of atomic blitzkriegs and lightning air wars," which he called "sensationally false."

Engineer Captain Khoholov, the Soviet naval observer at the 1946 Bikini tests, wrote that the tests "disenchanted millions" who had believed in the atomic bomb's "awful destruction." Another military authority then wrote that Bikini offers further confirmation of the fact that the atomic bomb, for all its destructive effect against peaceful cities, cannot by any means decide the outcome of a war.

Stalin himself voiced his views for the Soviet forces and the world in just these terms. Just before his death he acknowledged that strategic air power —using atomic weapons—could wipe out both Moscow and New York, but added that it was not a "decisive force."

In the Soviet view, America's military leaders have had good reasons for falsifying history and giving a build-up to wonder ways of war.

Since the American people were tired of war after V-J Day, "a noisy campaign was started to convince simple-minded persons that the [atomic] bomb would put an end to militarism, and that its invention did away with the necessity of maintaining a costly army and navy. Thus at the beginning the "new militarism" was sold on the basis of no trouble and low cost. "In a word," wrote a Soviet general late in 1946 (who used twenty-eight) "the militarists are trying to prove that their program, unlike previous programs is a cheap one: all that is needed is bases, aircraft, and atomic bombs-nothing more."

THE Soviets have detected a campaign in America to "kindle war hysteria." The Soviet Navy was told in 1951, that in the U.S. "facts indicating the peaceful development of the Soviet economy... are hushed up in all possible ways; the aggressive measures of the Anglo-American are ludicrously represented as 'defensive' ones."

U.S. forces have been thoroughly indoctrinated in this, the Soviets say.

"The number of hours which the American command allocates to ideological treatment of its West Point audiences, for example, amount at the present time to forty per cent of the instruction period," reported the Soviet Army and Air Force newspaper Red Star in 1951. The principal content of this "instruction" can be guessed from a 1950 report which baldly asserts: "A significant phase of the system of political training of the American Navy is that of anti-Soviet propaganda, directed toward the kindling of hatred and enmity toward the Soviet Union."

By the use of such methods, the American "warmongers" have been able to secure support for the build-up of vast numerical superiority over Red Forces. "The armed forces of the U.S., Britain, and France are now more than double the armed forces of the U.S.S.R. and are rapidly increasing," the then Deputy War Minister announced to the Soviet forces in 1951.

The Soviet leaders not only warned their forces that America was "warmongering" but they also reassured them with the news that "reactionaries in the Anglo-American bloc" have continued to "allow their military science to be permeated by a hazardous spirit."

To the Soviets, a "hazardous" or "adventurous" military policy or doctrine is one such as the Nazis followed. Admiral Yumashev put it this way: "While frightening the people by innovations in military technology, they shouted in their propaganda that modern warfare would be waged only by the air force, tanks, or small professional forces, that it would be swift as lightning."

Of course—for the Reds—"the course of [World War II] events dispelled all of Germany's pre-war theories, and proved the complete superiority of Stalin's military science." But the "Anglo-American militarists" cannot do otherwise than follow in Hitler's footsteps, the Russians say, because they are "deprived of the support of the people." That is why American leaders "vaunt as a means of easy victory in a blitz war" such weapons as the atomic bomb.

THE Communist leaders say that American "imperialists" have no real appreciation of the need for popular support. We Americans have missed the human factor—particularly morale-building matters, they say. This was demonstrated to the Russians satisfaction by our failure to push Chiang Kaishek on to victory over the Reds after V-J Day. "On the side of Chiang only a year ago there was numerical superior-



ity and advantages of military equipment," Red Star said in 1949. "There were American military advisers and experts. There was everything. Only one thing was missing—the soldier. The man was missing."

We Americans finally woke up to the importance of individual human beings when we could no longer escape the truth that World War II was won by the Soviet soldier and Red "victories in China" by Chinese soldiers. But our awakening was accompanied by a great fear, said Red Star. We became "frightened to death to speak of the human factor in war. Speaking of this would mean admission of their own weakness. Therefore the haphazardous warmongers . . . continue to babble about the atomic bomb and are helplessly silent about the soldier-the man." The Chief of the Soviet Navy summed it up in 1949 when he said: "the bourgeois are afraid of mass land armies.'

Events in Korea proved the validity of these views, the Communists sav. A Chinese summary of what happened when they intervened in 1951 noted: "Everybody knows that the American troops had good modern arms and a great quantity of aircraft, tanks and artillery; while the Chinese People's Volunteers did not have tanks and earlier did not have aircraft. They had at their disposal only a small amount of artillery and light infantry arms. However, the enemy did not beat them. On the contrary, they beat the enemy." In mid-1951, the Chinese gave as the reasons for their "victory," "the fact that the political quality of the American soldiers who use these superior weapons, is very different from ours."

Official Red publications paint a dreadful picture of the American fighting man. He's tainted with cowardice, laziness, irresponsibility, lack of training and education, drunkenness, and debauchery, sex and sadism, venality and corruption. According to the Reds, the American command doesn't want him different, for then he wouldn't fight the "peace-loving" Communists. U.S. imperialists, says one Soviet publication, want to turn U.S. soldiers "into submissive robots."

THE Reds also tell their forces that our officer personnel is venal and incompetent. The Reds say that the U.S. forces are "in no way remarkable with regard to talented strategists and military technicians." Which is one reason, they say, why we have been anxious to get the Germans and Japanese in our fold; the military leaders of the

defeated enemies are, in the Red view, superior to our own. A Captain Doidzhasvili in Red Fleet told fellow Soviet sailors of the "limited mental capacity of the majority of the midshipmen" at Annapolis, and the Red Chinese have told their troops that "generally there are very few [U.S.] officers" who have "an open mind and progressive thought."

For Soviet and Chinese forces, the limited operations during the Korean Truce talks were pictured as attempts to open up the war—which the Reds frustrated. Typical of this is Colonel Bozhenko's briefing of the Soviet Army on the fighting which included Heartbreak Hill and Bloody Ridge:

"Van Fleet hoped his large number of troops would break through . . . then mobile units would have been thrown in and penetrated into North Korea and developed the offensive to the North . . . Van Fleet tried to conceal his usual failure by depicting the offensive he had organized as a limited action." A foolish claim, the Colonel noted, "judging from the number of troops brought up to take part."

Americans may be surprised to learn that they have satellites, but the Reds tell each other that a "victory formula" which is popular among the American militarists, is the method of getting others to fight their wars. Red Star observed that without satellites America would lack the manpower masses deemed necessary by her policy.

However, Red Star says that U.S. authorities have begune to question this and other "victory formulas," such as the air-atomic one. ". . . the protagonists of the various types of blitzkriegs, compelled by the inexorable facts and events, are now trying to establish com-Among them is promise theories . . ." 'notably the so-called 'air bridge' doctrine whereby the rapid deployment of troops to points where needed will be carried out by the Air Force." Another authority notes that events and the too-apparent facts of history have "impelled the American militarists to renounce a number of the obviously obsolete theoretical positions," although these are "of a fundamentally technical char-

THE Reds are critical of U.S. armored warfare doctrine—as they interpret it. In the Reds' view Americans don't like the tank because it's an arm of close ground combat, requiring big backing by the "human factor"; and because it's not in line with the post V-J Day U.S. air-sea-atomic power policy. On Tankist's Day last year, a General Poluboya-

rov said that American soldiers don't like tanks because they aren't fast enough to flee in and that U.S. tankers abandon their armor and withdraw in faster trucks. But now U.S. authorities are ruing their neglect of armor, the Soviets say.

The Reds say that in Korea American forces "have suffered unparalleled military defeat" despite "colossal superiority in weapons, and vast naval and air armadas." This, they say, has caused an acute crisis in American military affairs. "The myth of the supremacy of American's weapons, which has been extolled by the admirers of American imperialism, has been dispersed like smoke when faced by reality." Now, the Reds say, we are talking big and making a lot of "noise about fantastic super-weapons and their unequalled power . . ."

But behind all this bombast the Americans are beginning to face up to military realities, the Reds warn their forces. The Reds have been asserting for some time now that "... along with the current strengthening of the Navy and Air Force of the U.S.A. measures are being taken for the formation of a mass land army."

In short, we Americans are now supposed to agree that the Red's doctrines of war were the correct ones all of the time.

T is wrong, I believe, to conclude that the strange things the Reds have to say about American military methods are propaganda. History tells us that military forces can get very wrong slants on each other for a variety of good reasons. Distorted opinions are likely to develop when opposing forces derive from very different types of civilizations. They're most likely to develop when their leaders lack outside contacts, as the Red Russian and Chinese leaders do. Thus the chief of the Foreign Forces West section of German Army Intelligence told the British after World War II: "We were always amazed at the old-line generals' completely illogical underestimation of the American forces." Hitler told his generals in a 1943 briefing: "America hasn't got much. . . . There is no spirit, no inner strength."

Out-and-out jingoism also plays a part in the development of distorted views of a foreign power. The Japanese had plenty of that in their Imperial forces. The Russians are patriotic; eleven years of intensive Soviet propaganda have magnified this. So it is only natural that they should be jingoistic.

Russian propagandists don't have to be ordered to distort history; they've got it twisted to begin with.

Also we Americans should remember that other peoples are not trained to see things our way. In point of fact the Soviets' military doctrine is German-based and differs widely from our own. Naturally their attitudes towards our forces are based on their own doctrines.

This is a vital fact in the cold war. It means that we can only impress the Soviets with our defense preparations and military actions if we explain them in terms that can be understood by Soviet military men. This will not be easy to do in any event because thirty years of militarism have made the Soviet nation so conscious of military methods—Soviet methods—that they possess nothing but contempt for ways of fighting other than their own.

In fact, few people in the West have any idea of the deluge of indoctrination on U.S. forces the Reds give their own forces. In the Soviet Army, the "political officer system" puts an 1&E officer in every company; he and others dispense their poison a minimum of thirty minutes daily, except on the two weekdays when they get two hours. Officers have to discuss and report on certain allied topics. For example a Soviet publication reported: "The library of the Officers Club of the Lvov Military District recently held a conference on the theme: The American Army is an army of Pillage, Murder, and Enslavement.'

This then is the problem that faces us: whether as the Russians (and the Red Chinese) become less and less impressed with American technological might they may be tempted to start a war. There can be little doubt that if a potential aggressor comes to believe that his enemy's doctrine is poor and his manpower low-grade, he would be tempted to attack. The Russians did that in Finland in 1940.

If a way could be found to disabuse the Communists of their misconceptions a war might be averted. We should try to find a way.

The first step towards a solution is to gain a thorough understanding of Soviet military doctrine and system. At present most Americans are quite ignorant of these matters. But once we grasp their ideas and methods we can talk to them in ways they can understand. And perhaps then, they may feel the chill of horror that we feel when we contemplate the dangers of a third world war. And realizing the horror they may be dissuaded from seeking a solution by force of arms.

* CEREBRATIONS

Our literate cocktail-hour tacticians stand to receive as much as \$10.00 for their contributions to this department. However, the price for those "dashed off" with scant consideration for the rules of composition and rhetoric will be much less. Hold them to four or five hundred words and type them double-spaced.

Why a Round Bull's-Eye?

A field representative of the Special Devices Center in explaining the difficulty of designing the electrically-controlled target asked why the bull's-eye had to be round. Everybody, young and old, answered: "Don't know. They've always been round."

That "always" is common. "We've always done it this way, so why change?"

Rifle shooting, or rather training for combat with the rifle, is an example. Infantrymen have always learned rifle shooting by spending long hours on known distance ranges. Recently, we have added transition ranges to the known distance range prior to combat firing ranges. But why not combat firing to start with?

In talks with scores of sergeants and lieutenants of infantry, many of them combat decorated in World War II and/or Korea, I've yet to find one who remembers a squad or platoon firing at an enemy farther than 350 yards away. With few exceptions, and all of them well taken care of by specially-trained snipers, the infantryman uses only the battle sight in combat.

The enemy is rarely seen at ranges greater than 350 yards and elevation and windage adjustments are seldom made in combat. Yet we use 82 hours teaching sight adjustment, precise positions and wind estimation.

If we want an infantryman who will fire on command whether or not the enemy is actually in sight, then let's train him to fire on command into a designated area.

I know one man with two DSCs earned in one war, Sergeant, now Captain, John D. Shelby of the 16th Infantry, who has many times said: "When I'm in a hole and bullets are flying around me I don't have to be hit to keep down."

General S. L. A. Marshall reports that fewer infantrymen fire when the chips are down. I believe our system of rifle qualification is responsible for this.

We take a green kid, talk trigger squeeze, sight alignment and wind velocity for 82 hours. Then, by publishing his name in conjunction with an arbitrary number we brand him as a poor rifle shot. The number or score may be the result of any number of mistakes, including typographical, but it matters not. The soldier is stigmatized as being less qualified than his buddies.

Comes the time when his sergeant signals "come on" and it's easy for him to compromise with his conscience. It has been quite thoroughly established that the last hurdle for the malingerer in combat is the one of letting his buddies down. We've made it easier by convincing the shirker, away back in training center, that his buddies won't miss him and his fire.

The psychology of the combat infantrymen aside, 82 hours, 376 rounds of ammunition per trainee, and four weeks out of sixteen in the ATP for rifle marksmanship is too much during mobilization. Too much when one considers how close we were to the manpower barrel bottom in World War II and the fact that there are no bull's-eyes in combat.

A solution? As they say in the QMC, try this for size:

Doctor Richard S. Hirsch of Tufts College has, in his study of rifle marksmanship, worked out a six-hour course of self instruction which apparently can replace our present preliminary rifle instruction. Using six sets of training film looped to continue on and on, he has taught thousands of trainees how to load and unload, how to adjust a sling, assume a prone position and fire upon command using the battle sight.

An infantry lieutenant with ten noncommissioned assistants can take 200 trainees who have finished Dr. Hirsch's six-hour PRI to a hillside and in two days make competent combat riflemen out of the great majority of them. Not a grade firing line with white sand, shelter halves and sandbags, but just plain grass, sticks, stones and trees. The lieutenant lines his 200 trainees up so that no man is behind another and tells them something like this:

"In a moment I'll blow a whistle and you will see enemy out in front of you.

Shoot until I blow the whistle again. Behind you there is ammunition. Take some now and get back to your positions but do not load. OK, everyone lock

your rifle and load."

At the whistle various sizes and shapes of silhouettes appear at varying ranges from 75 to 350 yards. The Special Devices Center has electrically-controlled targets that can be raised and lowered from a central control point. After most of the trainees have changed clips-being human some of them will have taken handfuls of ammunition, others a clip or two-the whistle is blown again and the trainees are told to lock their pieces and the noncoms check the lockings.

Again we must call on the ingenuity and mechanical know-how of the Special Devices Center. For we will need some means of quickly and accurately counting the hits and transmitting the information to the lieutenant on the firing line. Given the information he

can announce:

"The first ten men on the right on the line have hit __ enemy. Some were hit more than once and since one hit is enough, only the first hit is counted. The second ten men hit ___, the next ten ___. Any questions?"

I maintain that there will be a soldier in one of the groups that had the least number of hits who will ask: "How come?" And there will be one in the group having the greatest number, eager to reply. The reply should be a pretty good description of how to look where one is hitting and how to fire by indirect aiming.

By allowing the discussion to continue, the lieutenant should see leaders develop or emerge from each group and trainee helping trainee understand the mysteries of "Kentucky windage." When the talk and demonstrations are at their height the lieutenant should announce:

"Let's try it again and settle the arguments. Get some more ammunition and come back to your positions. Do not unlock your rifles until the whistle

I'll wager a yen or two that the trainees will pick up more ammunition than they did the first time, that they will fire sooner and more rapidly after the whistle blows, and that as a group they

will get more hits.

Again blowing the second whistle after the majority have changed clips at least once, the scores are announced and a ten-minute break is given. The noncoms, meanwhile, although primarily watching for safety violations, should be observing their sectors of fire and mentally cataloging the firers. During

the break, if I know the trainee as well as I think I do, the talk will be of the rifle and how to get more hits. The NCOs should remain with their own groups during the break so that they can be consulted by trainees.

Following the break (and if the lieutenant is wise, he will not use a watch to determine when the break should end) an announcement is made gener-

ally as follows:

"Let's try it again but this time it's for keeps. After the firing, the noncoms will select the best shots for designation as EXPERT RIFLEMEN. The men selected will be given expert badges and will be announced in orders as expert riflemen. They will have the rest of the day off and will get a theater pass good on this post as long as they are trainees. Take a few minutes to talk it over and when you are ready one man in each group will hold up his hand. All right, lock your rifles, get as much ammunition as you think you will need and get back to your positions. Do not fire until I blow the whistle and cease firing when I blow the whistle the second time.

When the firing is completed this third time, and enough fire must be allowed to give the noncoms an opportunity to study each trainee, ten per cent or so of the entire group should be selected by the noncoms and given expert badges on the spot. A mechanic can recognize another by the way the wrench is picked up and adjusted and a butcher can tell another by the way a quarter of beef is cut. By the same token, an experienced rifleman can pick out the man who has either fired a rifle before or has a natural gift for marksmanship. Selection of experts by observation is no more haphazard than the present system of chance and collusion. And, after all, what difference is it if a mistake is made and one or two poor (?) shots are selected?

During the next two or three days the experts should be scheduled for a range with the best individual coaches. They should be issued telescopic sights and given free rein to fire as long as and how they wish. Targets should be various types of silhouettes set out at ranges up to 1000 yards. Here is the place for

learning the refinements.

The men not selected as experts continue firing in the same way but with one difference. Since there are fewer men on the line, the noncoms may help those who need the least correction. As the men get the knack of field firing they may be excused and returned to the garrison. Eventually, and I feel after only two days of firing, only 20 or

30 men out of the original 200 who do not understand the mechanics of shooting the M1 at field targets will be with

What to do with these men is a problem for G1. As a long-time infantryman, I say they belong in common specialist schools, but I'll back up for the loud dissenters and train them for weapons platoons. I will insist, however, that they should not, as they do today, take the very best of the coaches away from the trainee who holds more

promise.

The present Army Training Programs, 7-600-1 and 7-601-1, Light and Heavy Weapons Infantryman, respectively, are sound and thorough but they require sixteen weeks to complete. Under the plan described here, competent combat riflemen can be trained in one week of the ATP rather than the three and a half we now use. Within 24 training hours we can separate the sheep from the goats, as it were, and still leave time for firing Tables VII and VIII of FM 23-5 in the first week of training. From the second week on we can start where the fifth week is in the ATP at present and still get graduate trainees qualified in MOS 1745.

CWO ALEX N. MRAZ

Napalm

I realize that my humble attempts to edify the Army by dispelling its admitted confusion concerning napalm will most likely be deemed "Fly-Boy" impudence and interservice subversive activities. However, as a civilian-in-uniform who has served with the Army, Navy and the Marines and since I am now an Air Force officer, I cannot let interservice sensitivity deprive your readers of the reason why burning napalm accelerates in flight.

The puzzle pointed out as such by Major General Bullene in his very interesting article "Wonder Weapon" in vour November 1952 issue can easily be explained. It can even be easily understood by those able to grasp the fundamentals of the Monroe Effect which is the basis for the cone-charge in the bazooka, the age-old action and reaction law, a little bit of vector geometry, and


arithmetic.

The Monroe Effect states that an exploding force expands with equal force in all directions perpendicular to the surface of the explosive. Monroe went farther than that but that is far enough for this problem.

I will not insult you by explaining that for every action there is an equal

FLAME THROWER

Unignited. Each blob of napalm goes at same constant speed carried by its own inertia and push of blobs behind it.



Ignited. Each blob adds its expanding force to the speed of itself and every blob in front of it. Each blob has the sum total of the explosive horizontal forces (both plus and minus forces) of the blobs behind it

and opposite reaction, or that the direction and magnitude of forces can be expressed as vectors which by using the most specific of all specific mathematics, namely, arithmetic, can be added or subtracted in whole or in trigonometrically calculated part according to their magnitudes and directions. I merely present my attached diagram which explains all.

In addition to the diagram, I point out that if the napalm stream is discontinued, the problem changes but not the basic fundamentals to solve the new and slightly different problem.

Incidentally, a cross wind breaks up the continuous flow—a chemical to make it more sticky might stop that—and therefore reduces the sum of the horizontal forces. This, naturally, reduces acceleration. An ignited flame-thrower shot in small spurts would not have the accelerating effect.

This is somewhat the same as why a ramjet can go faster if it does go faster. That is, the faster a ramjet goes the faster it can go. Or easier yet: it cannot go faster unless it goes fast or how much faster it can go depends upon how fast it is going. Clear?

Now of course all I have said about napalm is only theory—I think in all fairness to me that it should hereafter be called "Bert's Burning Blob Belief" and I would not stake my professional reputation on it because I am void of professional reputation in these fields. I am just a downtrodden Air Force communications officer doing what I usually do for the armed forces, that is, seeing that the right information, knowledge, and messages get to the proper people. As well you know, and as Clausewitz so cleverly noted, Congress can make a general but it takes communications to

have a Commanding General commanding commands.

Major Bert Decker Air Force

Armor Is Mobile

Mobility today means "the ability to move fast while under fire in a combat situation" together with the ability to fire effectively during movement and/or immediately upon halting. This is 20th Century battlefield mobility, and in this century armor possesses a battlefield mobility far superior to any other arm.

It is this type of mobility that enables armored formations to pierce through and/or swing around the enemy; to cut deep into and shatter his communication zone; to achieve decision. While it is true that armor, more often than not, receives assistance during the initial stages of its breakthrough, the fact remains that no other arm has the ability to "cash in" on the potentialities created by sudden, violent, deep penetrations, pursuit, and exploitation.

Whether or not the United States can build enough armored outfits to defeat the enemy while continuing to provide our infantry divisions with the equivalent tank strength of two batttalions, is beyond my knowledge. However, should it be decided that it isn't possible then the present infantry division tank strength should be reduced in order to form more armored units. Tank units, and especially regimental tank companies, of the infantry division are chained to the infantryman and consequently lose most of armor's tactical mobility and all of its strategic mobility.

Time and science may make the tank as obsolete as horse cavalry. If so, science will have succeeded in destroying true battlefield mobility, for the fact is, that no other form of motorized movement can exist in combat where tanks cannot. In other words, weapons which completely eliminate the tank would do the same to all other battle vehicles.

If battlefield mobility is thus destroyed what is to prevent the return of static warfare and its senseless destruction without decision?

Should "large-scale airborne operations" be the answer, shouldn't we give the enemy credit for developing guided missiles at least as good as ours before he starts a major war? The answer, like it or not, has to be affirmative, With his air force, and guided missiles (as well as long-range missiles with atomic war heads) can anyone believe that "large-scale airborne operations" are a sound gamble?

Regardless of how airborne troops arrive for battle, they can only fight and win battles on the ground. Also, victory is insured by ground forces holding enemy territory. This brings us once more to mobility on the ground, a mobility which no longer will be possible if the tank is indeed obsolescent.

Shouldn't we all have the greatest interest in not only how science plans to destroy battlefield mobility but much more in what is being done to preserve it?

Let's all encourage our best scientific and industrial minds to produce new and better antitank, and antimobility weapons. But antitank-antimobility weapons are defensive in essence and a war has yet to be won defensively. So let's not "take counsel of our fears" but instead charge our scientists with the task of inventing means for preserving and improving battlefield mobility.

CAPT. É. R. BRIGHAM Armor

CAREER MANAGEMENT AND YOUR FUTURE

THIS is the second in the series of articles on Career Management and how it works. If you have any comment or questions on this series please feel entirely free to write the editors or Career Management Division.

Rotation of Assignments

THE peacetime mission of the Army is to prepare for war. So it is imperative that the Army train and develop an officer corps that is qualified and prepared to serve effectively in any emergency under any conditions. The best way to do this is by rotation of assignments.

Generally speaking, rotation of assignments is the responsibility of the Career Management Division, The Adjutant General's Office, and the commanders in the field. CMD assigns officers and provides opportunity for schooling; however, Career Management cannot alone develop a proficient officer corps. Successful development of an outstanding officer corps depends primarily on the initiative, willingness and ability of commanders to rotate officers in various types of duties.

Our complex Army has many fields open for an officer who desires to specialize. But it must be remembered that an officer of the combat arms is basically and fundamentally a fighting man. For this reason, branch material assignments should continue until an officer has completed the branch advanced course and is fully branch qualified. However, in certain individual cases upon completion of three years of service, officers may enter certain specialization programs. After an officer indicates a desire to specialize, he may expect at least one full tour in the selected field in order that the Army may get full value from its investment. Additional tours may be dictated by requirements. Where possible, assignments to specialized duties are alternated with branch assignments so that the officer will remain fully branch qualified.

CAREER Management assigns the newly commissioned lieutenant to the appropriate branch school for basic training in his branch. Upon graduation, he is assigned to troop duty for the first few years of his service; it is during this period that the commander has the responsibility of teaching the young officer how to successfully lead troops and inintroducing him to such troop duties as command, supply, vehicular maintenance and teaching.

CMD controls the assignment of officers when they graduate from branch advanced course. Consistent with military needs, an officer can expect to be assigned to one of four broad fields: additional troop duty, staff, civilian components or specialization.

The "directed and recommended MOS," one of the most effective tools of Career Management, was suspended shortly after the outbreak of the Korean conflict. If either or both are reinstated more officers will be qualified to serve in more fields.

CAREER Management, following closely the officer's development, determines the type of assignment that will meet requirements of the Army and will be most beneficial to the officer.

An officer who has not attained full benefit from his previous troop duty, due either to poor local assignments or unfortunate circumstances, may be reassigned for additional troop duty in order to become fully branch qualified. Then again there may be an urgent requirement for experienced troop officers in some particular unit.

Generally, an officer upon completion of the branch advanced course has obtained the necessary schooling and experience to qualify him for staff or civilian component duty. To the staff, the officer brings his knowledege of troops, their problems and their viewpoint. From the staff he learns the planning, coordination, and the operations necessary in a higher command for the successful employment of troops on the battlefield. To the civilian component he brings his background and knowledge of the professional soldier and imparts this knowledge in the training of our citizen soldiers.

The ensuing years to the grade of lieutenant colonel are served in any combination of the several fields. Successive tours on the staff should not be in the same staff activity. Commanders should strive to assign officers to allied duties

such as placing the officer with a supply background in G3 and the personnel man in G4. It is the duty of all of us who are responsible for assignments to avoid too frequent repetition of the same type of staff duty.

Command positions are relatively few at the battalion level and an officer may have to wait several years for the opportunity to lead troops. But he should have this opportunity, and the earlier the better. It is here again that the divisional and large installation commanders can assist Career Management Division in giving an officer the kind of duty that will broaden his experience.

THE importance of rotative assignments lessens considerably for officers who reach the grade of colonel, provided their earlier years have been monitored properly. At this stage of his career, the able officer will be qualified to perform in many different fields. There are, however, a few young colonels, who have not had the proper rotation of assignments in the past. Here's an example.

Colonel "A" is an outstanding officer. During his earlier years he had many various duties up to the grade of captain. At the outbreak of World War II he was on staff duty. Because he was an outstanding staff officer commanders kept him on staff duties. Now he needs command duty as soon as possible. Career Management, with the assistance of commanders in the field, will give Colonel "A" the duty he needs to round out his career.

The principles of rotative assignment applied with common sense will avoid the two major pitfalls which confront us, the production of the professional staff man and the perennial commander.

Career Management tries to make it possible for each officer to have the experience that will permit him to overcome any emergency or obstacle that may come up. It is the responsibility of each commander to assist CMD in this task.

[Next month: Selection for foreign service]

FRONT AND CENTER

THE ARTILLERY SCHOOL

M500 Series Fuze Adopted

The Artillery is now using the M500 series fuze (mechanical time-superquick) as a standard item, the Department of

Matériel, TAS, reports.

The new fuze is far superior to both the M55 and the M67. Temperature frequently causes erratic functioning of the time element (i.e., powder train) in the M55. But the M500 is not affected by temperature, and its maximum time setting is increased to 57 seconds as compared with the 25-second limit of the M55. The new fuze differs from the M67 only in that it has a point detonating element to cause superquick action in the event of time mechanism failure. But this latter feature stands in sharp contrast with the M67, which, containing no such element, becomes a dud when the time mechanism fails to operate.

In addition, the M500 series fuze comes in two models for field artillery use: the M500 for standard projectiles; the M501 for base ejection type projectiles. The old M67 requires Ordnance modification to be employed with base ejection shells.

Revised FA Battery Test

The new ATT 6-1, a revision prepared by TAS, has been printed and distributed by Department of the Army. The test is designed to ascertain the proficiency of field artillery howitzer or gun batteries, except 8-inch gun, 240mm howitzer, and 280mm gun units.

Certain things in the new test are considered improvements over the 28 February 1951 version of ATT 6-1. Changes of note

are-

- The test has incorporated a check list for umpires; this will serve two purposes: One, grading will be more uniform throughout the Army; two, units to be tested can see exactly what Army Field Forces expects of them in the way of performance by a study of the weights assigned the various activities. This is particularly true with regard to communication requirements.
- The test recommends that a battery not having a stabilized strength of 90 per cent of its authorized strength not be tested. If the battery is below that strength and the test is directed, the new publication requires that the chief umpire analyze the distribution of personnel within the battery and make appropriate modifications in the test.
- The test provides for more specific grading of the various activities that are included in the rendezvous, march forward, and occupation and organization of the position.
- The test provides for some arbitrary grade cuts for failure to organize installa-

tions tactically, for serious violations of artillery procedures, and for rounds falling within friendly front lines.

Reading Improvement Program

All personnel at Fort Sill have the opportunity to participate in a revised reading improvement course offered free. Members of the 1952-53 Artillery Officers' Advanced Class who took the course had an average increase of 107 words a minute in reading rate and an 11 per cent increase in comprehension. Another example is that of a recent course graduate who was able to increase his reading rate from 500 to 1,500 words a minute and to comprehend 90 per cent of the material he covered. In. striking contrast, statistics reveal that the average American adult reads only 300 words a minute and comprehends only 85 per cent.

The reading improvement program, begun in 1948 as a function of the Department of General Subjects, has undergone a complete revision this year: A new series of tests is being used to determine the individual's progress in reading rate and comprehension throughout the course. New tachistoscopes have been installed in the laboratory; these machines show timed exposures of numbers to help the individual increase his visual acuity and widen eye span. Another device is a reading rate controller, which causes the student to read at accelerated rates, thus forming better reading habits and increasing reading rate and comprehension. Purchase of two diagnostic machines for the reading laboratory has been approved: One machine is an ophthalmograph, which photographs the student's eyes during reading and thereby allows both the student and the supervisor to review the eye action to detect improper eve movements that adversely affect the reading rate and comprehension. The second device is a sight screener; it diagnoses muscular deficiencies of the optical area.

This year for the first time, the Artillery Officer Advanced Class will be so scheduled that the laboratory will accommodate the entire class concurrently.

Terminology

In furtherance of the SOLOG program, representatives from TAS recently attended a conference at The Royal Canadian School of Artillery, Camp Shilo, Canada; the senior TAS representative acted as senior U. S. representative. The objective of the conference was to reach final agreement on standardization of artillery terminology and procedures for use by the armies of the three countries concerned—the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada. Preliminary work and conferences on this project have been conducted during the past two years. Final agreement was reached

by the conferees within the following specific areas:

 Standard method of adjustment of artillery fire by the forward observer and air observer.

Standard field artillery terminology.
 An interim agreement was reached on a standard form for artillery meteorological messages; whereas, standardization of a form for firing tables for similar type weapons was suspended.

It is expected that OCAFF will accept and publish the terms of the agreement in

the near future.

New Training Ha

On l August, the Office of the Deputy Commanding General, TAC, was established with Brig. Gen. James F. Brittingham—formerly Assistant Commandant, TAS—assuming its duties. With functions similar to those of a brigade commander, the Deputy CG is in command of all general reserve and continental operating units, except military police, at TAC. While his responsibilities center primarily around training, he is also concerned with disciplinary, maintenance, and housekeeping standards. When USAR and NG units are in training here, he will assume similar responsibilities for them.

On the same date, Brig. Gen. Thomas M. Watlington became Assistant Com-

mandant, TAS.

Summer Camps End

Fort Sill's biggest summer camp season in recent years has ended. Nearly 4,500 members of various reserve components participated in the June-August training; while operations were handled by five separate camps. Artillery training was predominant, but other branches were also represented.

Two USAR unit camps were held, each for a two-week period. Representing some twenty-five reserve organizations, they had a combined personnel strength of approximately 900. A senior reserve officer was, in each case, appointed Deputy Camp Com-

mander.

The Fort Sill USAR Schools Camp—different in concept from the two unit camps—opened on 12 July and ran until 26 July. Students and instructors were drawn from all USAR Schools in the Fourth Army area. Three schools, operating concurrently, were incorporated in this one camp: an artillery school, a signal school, and a C&GS school.

The longest and largest of the camps was that of the ROTC, running from 20 June to 31 July. Its attendance passed the 2,000 mark. Some eighty higher schools

were represented.

The National Guard encampment began on 16 August. The camp was headed by the XLI Corps Artillery, and participating guardsmen came from Arkansas and Texas.

THE INFANTRY SCHOOL

Officer Candidate School

TIS has graduated its last all-Infantry Officer Candidate class. The new classes are composed of candidates for all branches except artillery and engineer.

Under the new program all new second lieutenants, except those commissioned in infantry, will attend their respective branch service schools upon graduation from the twenty-two week Infantry OCS.

USAR Training

Active duty training for reservists from Infantry, Quartermaster, Judge Advocate General, Medical and Chaplain Corps branches, within the Third Army Area, was conducted at TIC during July and August.

This instruction was designed to provide officer and enlisted reservists with summer field training to supplement their respective local reserve units and schools. It also provided a means of keeping abreast of the latest developments in military organization and operations.

The Judge Advocate General and Chaplain's Schools provided on-the-job training in those fields.

New Book Catalog

The 1953-54 edition of the Catalog of Instructional Material from TIS is now available. The new catalog lists lesson plans, problems representative of the map problems presented at The Infantry School, special texts, and pamphlets varying from booklets to one-page statistical compilations, as well as maps and military books. The latest Infantry Field Manuals are also available. As a convenience and service to its catalog customers the Book Department also makes available school and training supplies. For the new 1953-54 catalog write: The Book Department, The Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia.

Advanced Leaders School

TIC started an Advanced Leaders School for its own senior noncommissioned officers on 1 September 1953.

The three-week course is designed to increase the leadership ability of Fort Benning's noncommissioned officers and potential noncommissioned officers possessing the required technical knowledge.

Instruction emphasizes methods of instruction, drill and command and leadership.

Training Areas Named

TIC has named eleven new training areas for Congressional Medal of Honor and Distinguished Service Cross Winners of World War II and Korea.

The new assault and attack course and firing ranges honor six officers and five en-

listed men posthumously awarded the nation's two highest decorations.

Included in the list was Brigadier General Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., who lost his life in France during World War II; Capt. Robert E. Roeder, Italy, 1944; Cpl. Clair Goodblood, Korea, 1951; Capt. Edward C. Krzyzowki, Korea, 1951; 2d Lt. Darwin K. Kyle, Korea, 1951; Sgt. William G. Fournier, Solomon Islands, 1943; Sgt. John R. Ruth, Korea, 1951; SFC Robert E. Dare, Korea, 1950; Cpl. Charles W. Sherwood, Korea, 1951; 2d Lt. Alfred P. Dianda, Korea, 1950; and Col. Harry A. Flint, Sicily, 1943.

USAR Orientation Course

The Infantry School held a one-week orientation course in August for fifty USAR instructors, Infantry branch directors and USAR school commandants.

The purpose of the course was to familiarize USAR personnel with instructional material furnished the schools by TIS, recommended methods of presenting the instructional material, new technical developments, and changes in doctrine.

ARMY-WIDE

Research. Many scientists in and out of government have voiced concern over the tendency to reduce the amount of money devoted to scientific research and development for defense. In his *Saturday Evening Post* articles, Gen. Bradley joined with them by suggesting that civilian scientists and engineers participate in strategic planning by the staff of the JCS.

Nicknames. Official designation of the 25th Infantry Division as the 25th "Tropic Lightning" Infantry Division may open the way for other divisions with famous nicknames to have them officially recognized. In some cases there could be controversy. The 2d Infantry Division, for example, is called the "Indianhead" Division by some and "Second to None" by others. There was the Southern soldier assigned to the 26th "Yankee" Division during World War II who went home on leave wearing the "YD" patch on his left shoulder. Questioned by his unreconstructed father as to the meaning of the initials, the lad thought fast and replied: "Yeah, Dixie."

General officer assignments. From acting Chief of Army Field Forces, Lt. Gen. John E. Dahlquist became Chief of AFF.
... Maj. Gen. Floyd L. Parks, Chief of Army Information, to CG, 2d Army.
... Maj. Gen. Albert Pierson, Chief of Joint MAG, Philippines, to Director, Joint Airborne Troop Board, Fort Bragg.
... Maj. Gen. William N. Gillmore, Director, JATB, to Chief, MAAG, Thailand.
... Maj. Gen. Joseph S. Bradley, Dep. Dir. of strategic planning for the JCS, to Europe, specific assignment unannounced.

Duty tours. Far East. Effective 1 Oct. fixed tours of duty in the Far East will

range from 16 months in Korea to 20-30 months in Okinawa, 24 months in the Philippines, and 24-36 months in Japan. Constructive credit earned before 1 Oct. will be counted by converting the credits to months served on a fixed tour. Marines plan 14-month tour in Korea by March 1954 and will gradually extend it to 16 months if "extension of Korean service proves necessary."....

ZI. RA enlisted men returning from normal overseas tour will serve at least 18 months in ZI before becoming qualified for overseas assignment again.

Rifle matches, At Camp Lejeune, N. C., scene of the Southeastern Regional High Power Rifle Matches, the Army rifle team made the highest score of any team using the service rifle, scoring 965 out of a possible 1,000, the highest rifle score ever recorded in competition. The team. coached by Lt. Col. William G. White, represented the Army at the National Matches at Camp Perry, O., 31 Aug. to Sept. 7. . . . At Wildflecken, Germany, a 19-man team from the 2d Bn., 102d Inf., 43d Div., represented VII Corps and won the Prix General LeClerc international small-arms shooting match. Seven nations competed; the British team was second and The Netherlands third. Weapons used were M1, BAR and caliber .45 pistol.

Regular officer resignations. Circular 58, dated 10 Aug., tells RA officers the Army will accept resignations for "compassionate reasons" and other valid reasons, such as hardship, health and safety. However, resignations will not be accepted from officers who have not completed mandatory periods of service or have other obligations requiring extended service.

Survivor benefits. The new law making it possible for service personnel to share their retired pay with their survivors will go into effect 1 Nov. and joint regulations setting forth the requirements and the machinery to put the law into effect will be published by DOD before that date.

Exchanges. The subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee that looked into complaints and charges, say the American Retail Federation found that they were "reckless and heedless" and that the principal sources of criticism "seem to be gossip, boasting, and inferences by careless people." The subcommittee said the PX system was essential, competently managed, and obeying the law.

Commissaries. Because the 1954 defense appropriation act requires the Secretary of Defense to certify that each commissary is necessary or it must be closed, the Secretary has ordered a survey to be completed before 1 Nov. of all commissaries. The survey must consider prices, facilities, and convenience of all commercial establishments in each area; there must be at least two commercial facilities in each area to provide "free and open competition."

* BOOK REVIEWS *

WELCOME, INDEED

ATOMIC WEAPONS IN LAND COMBAT. By Colonel George C. Reinhardt and Lieutenant Colonel W. R. Kintner. Military Service Publishing Co. \$3.95.

"I welcome this study of atomic weapons in land combat as a first step in widespread discussion of, and education in, a matter vital to America's security," Lieutenant General Manton S. Eddy wrote in the foreword of this book.

I wholeheartedly second General Eddy's welcome to this book, and particularly for military readers and regardless of their rank or length of service. Security considerations have necessarily limited to a trickle, relatively speaking, the amount of

The author of this review was the Commanding Officer of the Artillery Group that fired the first atomic shell from the 280mm gun. He is now a student at the Army War College.

unclassified official doctrine on atomic weapons. The unfortunate result is that only a very few of us have enough sound information to really study the use of atomic weapons on the battlefield. Timely indeed is this book which "explores the implications of atomic warfare on or near the battlefield and gives a forecast of what atomic warfare may mean to all combat rank..."

Fortunately, moreover, the substantiality of Atomic Weapons in Land Combat is enhanced by the fact that the authors wrote it while serving together in the Department of Analysis and Research of the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth. Although they are careful to note that the book in no way reflects the official views of the Department of the Army, the reader cannot be unmindful of the fact that the Command and General Staff College is a primary source spring for the development of tactical doctrine for the target level of this book-namely, ". . . the problems which atomic warfare poses to division, regimental and battalion commanders .

Atomic Weapons in Land Combat is exceptionally readable and, equally important, is in language readily understandable to all readers, civilian or military. In addition to an index, the book includes an appendix into which are gathered certain useful definitions, charts and tables.

The authors adhere to the thesis, now generally accepted, that the advent of the atomic era has not altered the fundamental principles of war. It is only their application that has changed.

Following a brief historical review of earlier "absolute" weapons, a reasoned debunking of some of the "scare" stories on radiation effects, and a brief discussion of the several means of delivering atomic weapons, the authors launch into their analysis of the use of atomic weapons in various types of land operations. JOURNAL readers got a taste of the book from the lengthy excerpt published in the September issue.

Tactics for the offensive and defensive to include airborne, amphibious, and certain special operations are examined. Logically and interestingly they raise and discuss the question "Is firepower now king?" suggesting that a new look must be taken at the "classic concept" of fire and movement. They point out that maneuver will in the future most certainly be strongly influenced by the capabilities of atomic weapons. Traditionally, artillery and other supporting fires have been planned to fit into and to support a maneuver concept, this concept being designed, ideally and if possible, to hit the enemy with overwhelming power at his weakest point. Mindful of the awesome lethality of atomic weapons, the authors suggest that future commanders may find it preferable (and I borrow their words) to "hit the mostest with the biggest," with the scheme of maneuver being built to maximize the exploitation possibilities created by the atomic weapons

The chapter on training-the authors label it "The Indispensable Ingredient"is solidly down-to-earth and easy to read and understand. Command leadership is discussed, to include the authors' ideas of the staff organization that will be required, both in the early stages (that is, from the present time until there exists a broad base of understanding of the capabilities of atomic weapons) and after we have grown mature in their employment. They belittle the need for an atomic special staff section, as such, but give emphasis to the requirement for training experienced general staff officers in all aspects of atomic warfare. Heavy emphasis is given-and properly in this writer's view-to the impelling need for all experienced leaders to erase from memory the basically undisciplined practices that were frequently condoned during World War II-security, supply economy, camouflage and concealment, discipline, mobility, communications and other fundamentals are analyzed against the anticipated character of land combat of the future. Also presented are the authors' views on probable organizational trends; specifically, they anticipate that "atomic warfare campaigns may witness divisions of half a dozen brigades, each fully capable of directing the combat destinies of six to eight relatively self-sufficient battalions."


The authors admit in conclusion that "the advent of atomic weapons on the battlefield is horrible to contemplate," but hasten to add that "none save romanticists have ever discovered a battlefield lacking

in horror, whether its weapons have been tomahawks or machines." And their final note is one of confidence that the free world will not "suffer in numbers or scientific development" and will, if forced to, "use them with a skill and determination that cannot be overcome."

It will come as no surprise, and least of all no doubt to the authors, that any militarily mature reader of Atomic Weapons in Land Warfare will find himself placing question marks on the page margins opposite certain statements and ideas. However, and as already suggested, this is the most valuable purpose this timely book will serve—to stimulate the forward projection of reader thinking. Will any logical mind question that other than the thin surface of the potentialities of atomic weapons on the battlefield has thus far been scratched?

Artillerymen (and this writer happens to be one) will be disappointed, to use a very mild term, at what they will construe as an apparent lack of appreciation that fire support is the artilleryman's battle business. The enviable artillery esprit rests on its proud record as the greatest killer on the battlefield; and artillery officers have coordinated the fire support (artillery, air and naval) for the greatest military operations in our nation's history. Apparently, however, these authors would have the general staff carve out and take over the heart of the artillery battle business. "Thorough knowledge of atomic tactical capabilities and limitations," they say, "will permit these general staff officers to advise commanders on the integration of atomic weapons into their operations." And a few lines later: "Although a tendency to regard tactical atomic weapons as just another form of artillery must not be exaggerated, there is indeed a similarity in the fire plans for both types of weapons." These statements are unsatisfying to artillerymen.

Properly, and throughout the book, the authors emphasize the reasons why, and make suggestions how, our intelligence capabilities must be improved in order to capitalize on atomic weapons capabilities. And, relatedly, they emphasize and caution us that the number of atomic weapons made available for tactical purposes may be limited. Projecting one's thinking forward (and this writer, like the authors, has no information concerning present or planned stockpiles of atomic weapons) these new weapons are here and, unquestionably, here to stay and, again unquestionably, will be improved at the maximum rate possible to our remarkable American genius for technological advance. Should, then, our forward thinking be bounded by a concept or framework of limited weapon availability? And, again relatedly, should our forward thinking not include an attempt to correlate traditional concepts and requirements for accuracy against the vastly in-



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
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creased lethality of atomic weapons? With national survival the possible if not the probable stake, surely a relative plenty of atomic weapons for land combat must be our goal. We military men must not be caught short in our forward thinking.

Despite the foregoing "haymaker" on artillery, honestly swung, this review ends with the thought on which it opened. Welcome indeed is this timely and stimulating book. It richly deserves a wide reader audience.-Colonel DeVere Armstrong.

WASHINGTON, THE MAN

THE GREAT MAN. By Howard Swiggett. Doubleday & Company, Inc., New York, 1953. 491 Pages; Index; \$5.00.

Like Minerva, who sprang full grown and in full armor from the head of Zeus, George Washington makes his entrance on page one of this book, aged forty-three, to command the Continental Army at Cambridge. His career before that is prologue that does not concern Mr. Swiggett, who is bent on making Washington a human being instead of a monument. Mr. Swiggett's unacademic approach to biography and history results in a vivid picture of the head of the Revolutionary Army, of Washington the President, and of the final years of the Father of his Country. More than that, it brings to life Washington's important contemporaries and the events of the war and of the early days of the Republic. Tactical details of battles are almost completely omitted, but this is advantageous in revealing Washington "as a complex but comprehensible human being." Mr. Swiggett's skillful use of the critical episode, the illuminating anecdote, the essential fact of history in letters, diaries, memoirs and records of the time maintains the reader's interest throughout at a high level. The book is a fascinating study of Washington's leadership and of the American soldiers and politicians in the war that established our independence.-BRIGADIER GENERAL DONALD ARMSTRONG

HAIG

HAIG: MASTER OF THE FIELD. By Major General Sir John Davidson. British Book Centre, New York, 1953. 158 Pages; \$4.50. THE PRIVATE PAPERS OF DOUGLAS HAIG 1914-

1919. Edited by Robert Blake. British Book Centre, 1952. 383 Pages.

Field Marshal Haig, who led the British Expeditionary Force in France from December 1915 to the end of World War I, was a controversial figure. Early writers such as Duff Cooper, Charteris, and Boraston have presented him as soldier of unshakable tenacity and incorruptible integrity. To their way of thinking Haig ranked with the greatest soldiers of British history. His professionally "sound" program of concentrating all military resources on the Western Front was contrasted favorably with the "amateur" strategy which sought to attack the enemy coalition on its weakest front. In Haig's advocacy of a strategy of concentric attacks against the German lines of communication in 1918 these writers saw the mark of a great commander. They failed, however, to get their estimate of Haig across to the British public, a failure which was attributed to the wickedness of "politicians" like Lloyd

Haig's critics, on the other hand, complained that he wasted his men on an unproductive front for four years simply because he could not think of anything else to do. They pointed to his misuse of the tank in 1916 and to his stubborn adherence to failing offensives on the Somme and Passchendaele as proof of his mediocrity. Haig's less scrupulous critics accused his headquarters of "doctoring" military reports to deceive the government. Certainly the relations between British soldiers and their civilian superiors reached a low ebb in World War I.

Haig took no part in the controversy which raged about his command in France. Though he kept a voluminous diary through the war years, no writer except Duff Cooper was allowed to quote from it. Haig discouraged his friends from rushing to his defense with books and articles and was content to let time vindicate his record in France. His heirs have at last permitted excerpts of his diary to be published and General Davidson, his former operations officer, has written a defense of his command decisions from 1917-1918.

Both Mr. Blake, the editor of the Haig papers, and General Davidson feel that the military weakness of France from 1917-1918 was one of the most important if unknown facts about World War I. It was concealed from the world at large by Haig's offensive program in 1917 which alone made the Allied victory possible. Haig concealed his first knowledge of the mutinies in the French Army in 1917 from the Cabinet. His alleged reason for doing so, that it was given to him in confidence by General Petain's chief of staff, can hardly be credited. One does not keep that kind of information from his government simply because it was given in confidence by a headquarters which specialized in breaking promises. Haig's real reason was he feared that this gloomy news would encourage Lloyd George to call a halt to offensive operations on the Western Front. In that case Haig believed the Germans would win the war by default.

It will strike many readers as amazing that Haig and Davidson thought it was praiseworthy for a British general to conceal the state of the French Army from his own government for fear that it would not act wisely on this information. Granting that Lloyd George was a scoundrel, it seems hard to sanction such conduct simply because military leaders could not trust the civilian leaders to act in the nation's in-

If Haig is to receive credit for keeping Britain and France in the war from 1916-1918, which was after all a political act, he cannot escape responsibility for the cost of the action he inspired. To judge from his diary he had no conception of what the victory was going to cost the British

Empire or of the relation of this cost to the value of the victory. No doubt Haig personally detested bloodshed and would have been glad to see the war end, but there is no hint anywhere in the published version of his diary that he would have considered a settlement on less than victorious terms. The British and French people found it a bit difficult, after the war, to reconcile the value of the victory with its cost-no matter what Haig thought. The general apathy with which the French and British people went to war in 1939 and the ineffective way in which at least the French fought, was not entirely due to weakness brought about by the losses suffered in 1914-1918 so much as it was to the widely-held suspicion that the leadership of 1939 was not only prepared to repeat the methods of 1914-1918 but was again doggedly prepared to pay the costs.

The Private Papers of Haig make possible a new estimation of Haig the man. if they do not permit a radically new view to be taken of him as a soldier. However inarticulate he might be in speech, Haig was by no means a fumbling writer. He had a surprising sense of humor as well as a keen appreciation of the weaknesses of his fellow soldiers. One page of his diary will give the details of a sermon he heard on Sunday; the next will recount Joffre's sage opinion of the kilt as the military uniform: "Pour l'amour, oui, mais pour la guerre, non." Haig's diary shows that he could turn a deft trick in the field of intrigue-if necessary.

American readers will be amused at the provincialism of Haig which permitted him to write on his first meeting with Pershing: "I was much struck with his [Pershing's] quiet, gentlemanly bearing-so unusual for an American. . . . His AG [Alvord] and C.G.S. [Harbord] are men of less quality, and are quite ignorant of the problems of modern war. The C.G.S. is a kindly, soft looking fellow with the face of a punchinello . . ." Again, but still in a surprised vein, he wrote to Lady Haig: "I have been seeing a good deal of Americans lately, and I must say, speaking from my own experience, our ideas of what American men are like was quite wrong. Those we are working with are quiet, unassuming, practical fellows. Entirely unlike the fashionable Yankees we used to see in London . . .

Later, however, when Pershing refused to amalgamate our troops with the British and French armies Haig described him as "very obstinate and stupid." In his opinion it was "ridiculous" to think that an American army could function without French or British staff assistance "in less than two years." In his eagerness to discredit the American staff performance in the Meuse-Argonne, Haig repeated without confirmation the legend that American troops were "really starving" because our supply arrangements had broken down.

Certainly Haig's refusal to accept honors from the British government until the wounded and sick members of the BEF were provided for marks him as a great man. Nothing in the diary, however, shows that he was aware that the combination of the entrenched machine gun and barbed wire had created a condition from 1914-1918 in which his traditional solutions were inappropriate. It was his misfortune not to have lived at a time when tenacity and minor improvements in infantry tactics were all that was required of a great commander. No one has, I think, put the case of Haig's professional narrowness with more charity than Lord Tweedsmuir: "He was first and foremost a highly competent professional soldier. Now, a soldier's professionalism differs from that of other crafts. He acquires a body of knowledge which may be varied and enlarged by new conditions, such as new weapons and new modes of transport, but which in essence is a closed technique . . . a powerful mind might work brilliantly inside its limits with little impulse to alter the fundamentals. Change and expansion were consequently in the nature of a revolution, and were brought about either by a great genius, or -slowly and grudgingly-by some cataclysmic pressure of facts. Hence the more competent and better trained a soldier was, the more averse he would be to alter his creed till its failure had been proved with utter finality." Nothing in these two books alters the weight of that opinion.-H. A. DEWEERD

MORE MICHENER

THE BRIDGES AT TOKO-RI. By James A. Michener. Random House, Inc., 1953. 147 Pages; \$2.50.

In this fine novel Mr. Michener has restated with considerable artistry the fundamental reason why free men will accept the risk of wounds and death, sometimes at incredible odds, in battle against their country's enemies.

He puts it this way: "... almost without knowing it he uttered the tricky words that bind a man to duty, those simple words that send men in jet planes against overwhelmingly protected bridges: 'If Cag can fly that flak, so can I.' That was what kept the Navy system working. You could weasel out any time, but within the essence of your conscience lived the memory of other men no less afraid than you who were willing to tackle the dirty jobs. So you stuck."

This is, to some extent, an oversimplification of a complex problem in psychology, but it is fundamentally true—as true for the infantryman, the artilleryman, the tanker, the sailor, for any man who fights, as it is for Mr. Michener's pilots. It is something that military men have known for a number of years, and that many non-military writers about the military have largely ignored or distorted.

Briefly, The Bridges at Toko-ri is the story of a carrier task force operating off Korea. The title is also the name of the target its pilots have been after for many months—perhaps the toughest target in Korea—four vital bridges in a deep valley with

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the only approaches at either end, guarded along its length by a complex of around two hundred antiaircraft guns.

The people of the novel—the people who are concerned with blowing up the bridges—are never fully developed, but Mr. Michener is very good at sketching in background with a few words or an incident from the past so that we can understand his characters even though we do not see them as entirely whole people.

This is a short novel and a deceptively simple one. The things Mr. Michener says are things the fighting man already knows, but he has gone a long way toward explaining to the earthbound soldier the feel of the air and of the men who must fly and fight there. He has done this better than anybody who has written about it since St. Exupery gave us Night Flight. He has also explained skillfully, simply and dramatically the operations of a task force and the mechanics, themselves often dramatic, of getting the jets on and off the carriers.

Mr. Michener is trying, in short, to show the American people the cost of the war in Korea, in men and in suffering, because, as Admiral Tarrant puts it, "If we refuse to acknowledge what we're involved in, terrible consequences sometimes follow." Let us hope he succeeds where others have failed.—O.C.S.

THE UKRAINE

UKRAINE UNDER THE SOVIETS. By Clarence A. Manning. Bookman Associates, New York, 1953. 223 Pages; \$3.50.

This excellent and concise history of the Ukraine between 1917 and 1950 ought to be read by every student of modern Eastern Europe. The recent history of the Ukraine is a terra incognita for most of us. While heretofore there always has been the handy excuse that it was most difficult to get at the facts, Professor Manning now has filled the gap in our literature: His book must be considered as a standard work which, for the first time, familiarizes the American reader with the essential knowledge about modern Ukrainian life.

The customary disregard of the Ukrainian question derives from a widespread opinion that, while the Ukrainians undoubtedly form a nation, their development to full-fledged and mature nationhood is only in its early beginning and that the Ukrainian nationality is more in the nature of a literary idea than of a political reality. The essential point is that the development of the Ukrainian nation has progressed very rapidly during the past 40 years. As time goes by, the Ukrainian question will become increasingly more important. If only by implication, Professor Manning's book drives home the point that it is no longer safe to ignore the Ukrainian problem which, in one way or another, bids fair to become one of the crucial issues of our

The book describes in detail Communist policies which officially protect and stimulate national cultural life and which allegedly uphold national independence. No nation is culturally and linguistically more closely related to the Russians than the Ukrainians. In no case would it be more reasonable to expect the Soviet Russians to live up to their own principles. The facts are, however, that from the very start the Moscow communists have made every effort to undermine and destroy Ukrainian nationhood.

Even the most knowledgeable expert in matters of Soviet tricks and tactics will find described in this book a weapon of which he never heard before; the dictionary. Believe it or not, they adopted a policy aiming at the disintegration of the Ukrainian language from within. This disintegration is accomplished by issuing dictionaries which suppress Ukrainian terms and which put forward, especially in the technical fields, Russian expressions. The official theory is that "thanks to the Russian language, the Ukrainian has been able to acquire the capacity to respond to the needs of socialist construction." The purpose is to force "Ukrainian to become a dead language and by an inverted purism . . . to compel the Ukrainians to recognize that Russian and Russian alone is in a position to grow and develop."

Two minor criticisms must be made. Professor Manning claims that the concept of spreading the Bolshevik revolution by armed force "collapsed with the defeat of the Red army at Warsaw in 1920 and . . was then condemned by Lenin himself." This is entirely incorrect as I think I was able to show in my own A Century of Conflict. Moreover, it is a most dangerous illusion to perpetuate. My second criticism is as follows: Professor Manning produces figures concerning the human toll of the various famines in the Ukraine. I do not quarrel with the author about his refusal to print even a single footnote in the entire book; in fact, I applaud this bold attempt. But I do think that he should have indicated how he arrived at his figures. Without proof or calculation the reader cannot know whether the human toll run into the millions or not. As long as no documentation is given, such figures, however correct they may be, must be treated as mere assertions.

Professor Manning's study is based upon a series of detailed studies prepared by a group of Ukrainian DP scholars. This is one of the first efforts to make intelligent use of such people. It is certainly an indication of how valuable DP scholars could be to the cause of the free world if they only were allowed to produce in their fields of knowledge and interest. After all, in the absence of documentary materials, personal experience is one of the few sources at our disposal with which we can study events behind the Iron Curtain.—

BOOKS RECEIVED

FAR FROM THE CUSTOMARY SKIES. By Warren Eyster. Random House. 372 Pages; \$3.75. A novel of men on a U.S. destroyer.

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
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